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Last Days of the Army of Northern Virginia 



AN ADDRESS 

DELIVERED BY 

GOV. THOS. G. JONES, 

BEFORE 

THE VIRGINIA DIVISION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF 
THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA 

AT 

THE ANNUAL MEETING, 
RICHMOND, VA., OCTOBER 12x11, 1893. 



[resolution.] 

Headquarters Virginia Division of the 

ASSOCIATION OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 

Richmond, Va., October 12th, 1893. 

At the regular annual meeting of the Virginia Division of the Association 
of the Army of Northern Virginia, held this day in the State Capitol, the 
following proceedings were had : 

Col. Richard L. Maury offered the following resolution : 

^''Resolved, That the thanks of this Association be tendered Governor 
Thomas G. Jones, of Alabama, for his able address on "The Last Days of 
the Army of Northern Virginia," and that a copy of same be requested for 
publication and the archives of the Association." 

Which was unanimously adopted. 

Test, Thomas Ellett, 

Secretary. 

[reply.] 

Montgomery, Ala., November 7th, 1893. 

Capt. Thomas Ellett, 

Secretary, Virginia Division, 

Association of Army of Northern Virginia, 

Richmond, Va. : 

Dear Sir — In compliance with the resolution enclosed in your letter of 
the 30th ult., I take pleasure in sending herewith copy of the address. I 
have delayed doing so until to-day, to perfect some of the notes to the text. 
Thanking the Association for the many kindnesses shown me, I am, 
Yours most truly, 

Thos. G. Jones. 




1665 G 



Last Days of the Army of Northern Virginia 



AN ADDREISS 

DELIVERED BY 

GOV. THOS. G. JONES, 

BEFORE 

THE VIRGINIA DIVISION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF 
THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA 

AT 

THE ANNUAL MEETING, 
RICHMOND, VA., OCTOBER 12th, 1S93. 



Gov. Jones, after appropriately acknowledging the kind 
introduction of the Chairman, said : 

Posterity will admit, as Greeley does in his "American Con- 
flict" that the Confederacy had no alternative to staying its arm 
at Sumter, but "its own dissolution." The smoke in Charleston 
harbor had hardly clearea away before there arose in. sight of the 
world the heroic figure of the Army of Northern Virginia. Many 
have questioned its cause, but none have ever doubted it. 

Washington and Richmond are about 120 miles apart ; and in 
assault or defense of these cities each section put forth its might- 
iest effort. The first army marched out from Washington for Rich- 
mond in 1861, and the Army of Northern Virginia routed it at 
Manassas. 

In 1862 it repelled the mighty army of invasion which came in 
sight of the spires of Richmond — defeated it and another army a 
second time on the plains of Manassas — baffled or beat other ar- 
mies at Winchester, Cross-Keys, and Port Republic — advancing 
northward captured Harpers Ferry with 11,000 prisoners, fought 
a drawn battle in Maryland — and hurled back a mighty foe at 
Fredericksburg. 



In 1863, it defeated "the finest army on the planet" at Chan- 
cel lorsville, and leaping Northward carried its standard into 
Pennsylvania, where it failed to drive the foe from the heights 
of Gettysburg, and then returning to its own soil again threw the 
hostile army back on Washington, and yet again balked invasion 
at Mine-Run, During that year it allowed no invading army to 
aj)proach at any time within five days march of its capital. 

In 1864 it hurled back one column at Bermuda Hundreds, an- 
other at New Market, still another at Lynchburg — won vic- 
tory at Kernstown and Monocacy, and assailed the outer walls of 
Washington. With the main invading army, under its sturdiest 
leader, it sought and nearly succeeded in a death grapple in the 
Wilderness — repeatedly repulsed it with frightful lossatSpottsyl- 
vania — won another Fredericksburg at Coal-Harbor — repelled 
with awful slaughter all attacks in front of Petersburg ; and for 
ten long months defended two cities 22 miles apart, until the 
thin line worn by attrition and starvation, was broken through at 
last. 

Four awful years passed before the armies which started from 
Washington trod the streets of Richmond ; and in each of those 
years the Army of Northern Virginia startled Washington with 
the roll of its drum, or fought battles for its possession north of 
the Potomac. 

The last hours of such an army have not received that consider- 
ation from the historian which they deserve. Knowing it will 
prove of interest to the survivors of that glorious army, and that 
perchance something I may say may serve to direct abler minds 
and pens to this rich epoch in its history, I venture to address 
my comrades to-night on "The last days of the Army of Northern 
Virginia." 

It is impossible, of course, in the scope or compass of such a 
paper, to give in detail the history of the events which forced the 
evacuation of Richmond, or to describe, except in the simplest 
way, the movements of the army from Petersburg to Appo- 
mattox. I shall not be able even to mention all the actions on 
the retreat or to describe many of its noted scenes or to recall 
many heroic feats of arms, or to attempt, were I worthy to pro- 
nounce it, any eulogy upon its great commander. 



THE STRENGTH OF THE CONTENDING ARMIES. 

The odds against which the army contended, both moral and 
physical, are not comprehended even now by many who took part 
in the struggle. It is material, theref('re, to consider the strength 
and conditions of the two armies at the commencement of the 
operations which ended at Appomattox. 

The exact strength of the contending armies at the opening of 
hostilities, March 25th, 1865, is a matter of some dispute. The 
morning reports and field returns of the two armies, however, 
give data from which the strength of each can be determined 
with substantial accuracy. 

Major General Humphreys, at one time Chief of Staff to Gen'l 
Meade, and afterwards a corps commander in his army, a writer 
of great ability and fairness, states that the total effective of Lee's 
army, on the 25th day of March, 1865, was it.fantry 46,000, field 
artillery 5,000, and cavalry 6,000, making a total of not less than 
57,000 officers and men. He appears to reach these figures on 
the assumption that Wise's Brigade, 2,000 strong, was not includ- 
ed in the reports of Anderson's corps, and that Rosser's cavalry 
was also omitted from the last morning returns of the Department 
of Northern Virginia of February 20lh, 1865. Not having the re- 
turns before me for inspection, it is impossible to determine 
whether the assumption is well founded.* 

The last morning report of the Department of Northern Vir- 
ginia was made February 20, 1865, and included not only the 
troops around Petersburg and Richmond, but those in the Valley 
and guarding bridges and railroads in the Department, and other 
unattached commands, and gives a total present for duty, in 
the entire Department, of 59,093 men. 5,169 of the number thus 
reported were stationed either in the Valley or on the railroad 
defences, leaving the total present of 53,924, on the Rich- 
mond and Petersburg lines on February 20, 1865. To this should 
be added the command of General Ewell, who had about 2,760 
infantry in the Department of Richmond, under General Custis 
Lee, and the Naval Batallion under Commodore Tucker. Includ- 

*Col. Taylor, in "Four years with General Lee," speaks of the morning return 
of February '2Sih, 18G5, while Humphreys and other Northern writers speak of 
the return of February 2Uth, 1865, as being the "last morning report of the A. N. 
V. on file in the War Deportment." All evidently refer to the same report since 
the fiirures in each arc tlie same. 



ing these in the total of the troops immediately around Rich- 
mond and Petersburg, General Lee's present for duty on the 20th 
of February, 1865, would amount to 57,000, in round numbers, 
of all branches ot the service. If we deduct from this number the 
6,041 cavalry and 5,392 artillery, it would give Lee six weeks 
before the final operations began, 45,567 muskets for the defense 
of his entire line of 37 miles from right to left. Of the cavalry 
present 2,500 were dismounted for lack of horses, and the horses 
of the remainder were hardly fit for use owing to the arduous 
service, the effects of the hard winter, and the scarcity of forage. 

Between the 20th February and the 1st of April, 1865, owing 
to the gloomy outlook ol the cause, and the great suffering or the 
men and their families at home, the desertions from Lee's army, 
according to the statement of his Adjutant General, amounted to 
about 3,0J0. Li the attack on Hare's Hill, on March 25th, the 
Confederate loss in killed, wounded and missing was about 3,500, 
to which should be added the loss on other parts of the 
line of about one thousand men, so that on tlie 
morning of the 29th of March, when Grant com- 
menced his final movement, and every available infantry man 
was in line, Lee could muster a little over 38,000 muske<s to with- 
stand the attack.* This estimate is substantially thatof Swinton, 
another very careful Northern writer, who states that at this time, 
"from his left north east of Richmond, to his right beyond Peters- 
tersburg as far as Hather's Run, there were 35 miles ot breastworks 
which it behooved Lee to guard, and all the force remaining to him 
"was 37,000 muskets and a small body of broken down horscl."' 

Mr. Stanton, Federal Secretary of War, reported that Gen'l 
Grant had available on the 1st of March, 1865, in the armies of 
Meade, Ord and Sheridan, an available total of all arms of 162,- 

*My estimate of the number of muskets available to Lee at the commencement 
of final operations, after deducting the losses by desertion between that time and 
Feb'y. '20th, 1865, and the casualties of March 25th, is a little less than Col. Tay- 
lor gives him a monih earlier before these casualitics occurred. He says "it will 
be seen on Feby. ^Sth, 1S65, Gen'l. Lee had available o9,S79 muskets." 1" reach 
my estimate by including the number of troops under Custis Lee and the Naval 
batallion, which are not borne on the last morning report of the N. N. V. of Feby. 
20th, 1S65, and accept, though it may be erroneously, the conclusion of Hum- 
phrey's that Wise's brigade is not included in these returns. Col. Taylor may be 
right and my estimate may be erroneous. My purpose in accepting the figures of 
Humphreys, is to show the disparity af numbers, even conceding all reputable 
clai.>.is of our strength by writers on the other side. 



239. General Humphreys, argues that this report does not cor- 
rectly state the "available force present for duty," because it in- 
cludes not only the "otficers and enlisted men of every branch of 
the service present for duty, but all those on extra or detail du- 
ty, as well as in arrest or confinement." He claims that the 
available strength of the army of the Potomac on the 1st of March 
1865, by this method of return, is increased by 16,000, or an ad- 
dition of about one-eighth to its real fighting strength. Making 
this deduction from the total effective of 162,239 reported by the 
Secretary of War and based on the returns from those armies, we 
would have a total of Grant's effective men, according to Gen'l 
Humphrey's method of computation, of 146,239.* Gen'l Hum- 
phreys taking the morning reports of March 31st, 1865, of men 
"present for duty, equipped" (which he states is meant to repre- 
sent the effective force, or total number of men available for 
line of battle, and excluding all non-combatants, sick, etc) gives 
the effective fighting strength of the army of the Potomac at 
69,000 infantry, and 6,000 field artillery ; that of the army of the 
James at 32,000 infantry, 3,0"0 field artillery, and 1,700 cavalry 
under McKenzie, and Sheridan's enlisted men, exclusive of officers, 
of the cavalry, at "J 3,000 — a total in round numbers of 124,700 men, 
according to Gen'l. Humphreys. 

Badeau, "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant," Vol. 3, p. 438, 
states : 

"On the 25th of March, 1865, Lee had still seventy thousand 
effective men in the lines at Richmond and Petersburg, while the 
armies of the Potomac and the James and Sheridan's cavalry, 
constituting Grant's immediate command, numbered one hundred 
and eleven thousand soldiers." • 

In an elaborate note on p. 439, he assails Col. Taylor's statemsnt? 
in "Four Years with General Lee," that Lee had at that time only 
39,879 available muskets for the defence of the Richmond and 
Petersburg lines, and endeavors to support his (Badeau's) state- 
ment of Lee's effective strength by a remarkably vulnerable argu- 
ment. 

Badeau writes as if he thought Lee's return of February 20, 
1865, included only the troops stationed in and around the Rich- 
mond and Petersburg lines. The return is copied in Badeau's 



*At this time Sheridan's cavah-y had noc joined Grant, and the return probably 
i ncluded troops at Norfolk and Fortress Monroe. 



work and he comments upon it and analyzes it. That return, which 
was before his eyes when he wrote, shows on its face, that it in- 
eluded not only Lee's troops stationed around Richmond and Pe- 
tersburg, but the troops as well of Early stationed in the Valley 
and then numbering 3,105 enlisted men, and also the troops under 
Walker, on the railroad defenses, numbering 1,414 enlisted men? 
and unattached commands numbering 504 enlisted men. Badeau 
assumes, indeed asserts, that the troops in the Valley and those 
on the Richmond and Danville defenses were used in the final de- 
fence of the Richmond and Petersburg lines. Was he so ignorant 
of events, of which he writes, that he did not know that over half 
of Early's little force in the Valley included in that return was 
either killed, wounded or captured in battle near Waynesboro, 
Virginia, with Sheridan's cavalry, on March 2, 1865? Those who 
escaped were disorganized, and when reorganized the greater part of 
them remained in the Valley — not over a fifth of the force, if that 
much, ever reached Lee. The troops on the Richmond & Dan- 
ville Railroad, the integrity of which line of supply was so vital 
to Lee, and then so heavily threatened, were of course not avail- 
able to guard the Petersburg lines. 

Badeau's method of arriving at Lee's effective strength on 25th 
of March, 1865, is indeed remarkable throughout. He cites Lee's 
return of February 20th, 1865, which, as we have seen, included 
not only Lee's troops around Richmond and Petersburg, but those 
in the Valley, and on the railroad defenses, and some unattached 
commands, and says that for the '-Army of Northern Virginia 
alone" the return shows 59,094 men present for duty, and an ag- 
gregate of 73,349. He then nearly doubles Ewell's effective 
strength (which it seems was not included in Lee's return of Feb- 
ruary 20th, 1865,) and adding that to the aggrpgate already re- 
ported gives Lee an aggregate of 78,433 on March 25th, 1865, 
exclusive of the naval battalion and some horse guards or local 
reserves. From this aggregate, in which are included all the sick, 
all the officers and men "on extra or daily duty," and all the offi- 
cers and men in arrest, in Lee's army, Badeau subtracts only 8,433 
for men not available for line of battle duty, and asserts that the 
residue of 70,000 is Lee's effective fighting strength ! 

The very return, on which Badeau bases his argument, shows 
that Lee, at that very rime, had 5,330 officers and enlisted men 
sick, and 7,179 enlisted men detailed in the various staff depart- 



mentp, and 830 men in arrest — a total of 13,728 soldiers, as Ba- 
deau himself estimates the number — who are never counted any- 
where in ascertaining the line of battle strength of any army, 
except when Badeau estimate Lee's effectives. Subtract this 
number, 13,728, from 78,433, the aggregate Badeau ascribes to 
Lee, and Lee would have only 64,705 effectives, including the 
5,169 effectives stationed in the Valley and on the railroad de- 
fences. These latter, we have seen, were not and could not be 
present at the final assault on the lines. If we deduct them, Ba- 
deau's own figures, after allowing an exaggeration of Ewell's effec- 
tives, would give Lee only 58,906 effectives on March 25th, 1865. 
In Vol. 3, p. 686, of the work, Badeau gives an official table, 
from the Adjutant General's Office, "of the strength of the forces 
under General Grant operating against Richmond from March, 
186-1, to April, 1865, inclusive." From the official record it ap- 
pears that in March, 1865, Grant had : "Present for duty, officers, 
5,288 ; enlisted men, 123,225 ; on extra or daily duty, officers, 1,060 ; 
enlisted men, 19,731; sick, officers 77, enlisted men 5,214; in ar- 
rest, officers 77, enlisted men 510" — a grand aggregate of 155,254, 
around Petersburg and Richmond. If we apply Badeau's lule for 
estimating Lee's effective strength, by deducting a little over one- 
eighth from this aggregate of 155,254 for men not available for 
line of battle duty, and treat the residue as Grant's effective 
force, it would give him over 1 35,000 eft'ectives. If we deduct 
from Grant's aggregate, all of his sick, extra duty men and those 
in arrest (which is generally considered a fair test of the fighting 
strength) it would give him 123,225 effectives on March 25th, 
1865. Badeau shrank from applying this test, which he used to 
ascertain Lee's effectives, because it would show that Grant had at 
least 24,000 more men than Badeau gives him. He does even 
worse. Grant's own returns, as we have seen, thow that Grant 
had at this time (after excluding all sick, extra duty men and those 
in arrest, which amount to 31,996 men) 123,255 effective enlisted 
men. Badeau, without so much as suggesting a reason for it, ar- 
bitrarily cuts Grant's effective strength down 12,000 below what 
his own returns show it to be, and puts his effective strength at 
"110,000 soldiers " Evidently Badeau felt that his method of ar- 
riving at Lee's effective strength, which was so different from that 
employed to ascertain Grant's, needed some bolstering up besides 
the figures he gave, and, he endeavors to support it by the bald as- 



sertion that the '"rebels habitually put into battle nearly all" of the 
extra duty men. If the "rebels" could do this, it is fair to pre- 
sume that Grant did it also. But it is impossible to use the bulk 
of the extra duty men in battle, as any experienced soldier knows, 
Gen. Humphreys' "Virginia Campaign, 1864-5," p. 409, speaking 
of such a claim, says : 

"The column present for duty equipped," is intended to give 
the uumber of enlisted men that form the fighting force of the 
army, together with those that may be made available for it, such 
as the provost guard ; but does not include those on extra or daily 
duty who form no part of this force, and are not available Jor iV 

All the military glory in the late conflict can not be awarded 
to either side, and there is enough for both. Whatever feats in 
arras either accomplished are now the common heritage of the 
American peoj^le. Where numbers are material in proving the 
prowess of either army, writers, and especially soldiers who 
fought in either army, should seek to get the facts as they existed 
and fairly apply the same methods to both armies for arriving at 
the truth. 

It is little to be wondered at that the statements of Badeau as 
to the numbers of either army, when he uses such methods to 
ascertain them, are generally considered as little authority by 
writers on both sides. 

It is an indisputable historical truth that Grant's army out- 
numbered Lee's nearly three to one on the morning of April 1st, 
1865. 

CONDITION OF THE TWO ARMIES. 

But comparison of numbers merely can not give any true 
conception of the disparity between the two armies. What the 
army of Northern Virginia fought in front, the world knows. 
What mighty obstacles fought it in the rear, the world will never 
know until the Contederate archives are all laid bare. 

One of the greatest of philosophers has said that "in war the 
moral is to the physical as three to one," and when this element 
is considered, the disparity in numbers and equipment between 
the two armies shrinks into insignificance, in determining the 
odds against which the Army of Northern Virginia fought. 

It is no vain boast or impeachment of the courage of the army 
of the Potomac to declare that the soldiers of the armv of Northern 



Virginia, standing on their own soil and in defense of their own 
capital, man for man, were superior to their opponents. But 
aside from the pkill and courage of the officers and men, devotion 
to their cause, profound faith and love for their commander, and 
a proud record of glory in arms which none ever surpassed, the 
Army of Northern Virginia was at that time at a fearful disad- 
vantage compared with the Army of the Potomac, not only in 
numbers and equipment, but in nearly all conditions and cir- 
cumstances that fight with the soldier and give power and soul to 
armies. 

The winter of 1864-5 was one of marked severity, making duty 
of any kind very arduous. The clothing of the Confederate 
troops, which at best was hardly sufficient, had become thread- 
bare and tattered, and they were often without shoes. Their food 
during this period consisted chiefly of corn bread, for there was 
little meat of any kind. Most of the bacon issued to the troops 
had been imported through Wilmington and other ports. The 
capture of these places cut off this source of supply, and when the 
supply on hand was exhausted little could be obtained else- 
where; for the meat in the country was about exhausted and the 
railroad facilities for hauling it were miserable. Medicines of the 
simplest kind were extremely scarce; and coffee, tea and sugar 
were generally rarities even in the hospital. Now and then the 
commissary department secured some peas and potatoes and 
sometimes fresh beef; and on this supply the army existed rather 
than lived during the winter of 1865. A soldier who received a 
quarter of a pound of bacon, often rancid, and a pound of flour 
for a day's ration considered himself most fortunate. The effect 
of this exposure and suffering upon the health of Lee's men, as 
compared with Grants, is strongly presented by the sickness in 
the two armies, as shown by their respective sick lists. Lee's re- 
turn of February 20th, 1,865, gives 5330 sick out of an aggregate 
of 73,349, while Grant's returns about the same time show a sick 
list of 5,360 out of an as'gregate of 155,224, or more than double 
the sickness in proportion in Lee's army than in Grant's. 

General Lee himself gives a vivid and sad picture of the suffer- 
ing of his army at this time, in a dispatch to the Secretary of 
War. Under date of 8th February, 1865, he says : 

"Yesterday, the most inclement day of the winter, the troops 
had to be maintained in line of battle, having been in the same 



10 

condition two previous days and nights. I regret to be compelled 
to state that under these circumstances, heightened by the assaults 
and fire of the enemy, some of the men have been without meat 
for three days, and all are suffering from reduced rations and 
scant clothing, exposed to battle, cold and rain. Their physical 
strength, if their courage survives, must fail under this treatment. 
Our Cavalry has to be dispersed loi want of forage. Taking these 
facts, in connection with the paucity of numbers, you must not be 
surprised if calamity befalls us." 

About the same time he notified the War Department that 
" the cavalry and artillery are scattered for want of forage, and 
the amunition trains are absent in North Carolina and Virginia 
collecting provisions," and adds, " you see to what straits we are 
reduced, but I trust to work out." 

In a secret session of the Confederate Congress, about, that time, 
the condition of the Confederate Commisariat was given as fol- 
lows : (1) There was not enough meat in the Southern Con- 
federacy for the armies it had in the field : (2) There was not 
in Virginia either meat or bread enough for the armies within her 
limits; (3) The supply of bread for those armies to be obtained 
from other places depended absolutely upon keeping open the 
railroad connections to the South ; (4) The meat must be ob- 
tained from abroad through seaport towns : (5) The transpor- 
tation was not now adequate, from whatever cause, to meet the 
necessary demands ot the service; (6) The supply of fresh meat 
to Gen. Lee's army was precarious, and if the army tell back from 
Richmond and Petersburg, there was every probability that it 
would cease altogether." 

It might have been added that the track and rolling stock of 
the railroads entering Richmond and Petersburg and their connec- 
tions, were so worn that they could hardly do more than haul from 
day to day the necessary supplies of food and military stores to 
keep Lee's army in readiness for the field, much less supply the 
wants of the population of Richmond and Petersburg. These 
roads were likely to be interrupted at any time by the floods or 
cut by cavalry raids. The accumulation of supplies for a few 
days ahead was an impossibility*. 

*As early as June 26, Gen. Lee wrote President Davis slating ' I am less un- 
easy about holding our position, than about our ability to procure supolies for 
the army." On 2'2nd July, 1864, he wrote the, War Department, "Our supply of 
corn is exhausted to-day, and I am informed that the small reserve in Richmond 
is consumed." 



11 

The James river, on the contrary, furnished Grant a line of com- 
munication and a mode of supply which could not be cut by raids 
or disturbed except by ships. One gunboat on the river could 
defy all Lee's efforts to interrupt navigation. A wonderful mer- 
chant marine transported on the broad bosom of the river all that 
wealth could obtain from every quarter of the Globe to add to 
Grant's magazines ; while it floated a powerful navy, which not 
only protected his line of communication and depot of supplies at 
City Point, but could join at pleasure in assaults on Lee's lines 
near Drury's Bluff. So great were the mechanical appliances at 
Grant's command, that we often heard the whistle of his locomo- 
tives on a military railroad which followed within half a day in 
the track of his columns. So great was the dearth of the necces- 
saries of life among Lee's troops at this same time, that we find 
him writing an earnest letter to the Secretary of War in regard to 
procuring material with which the soldiers could make soap, for 
want of which there was much suffering. 

Sherman's march to the sea, with its wide swath of destruction, 
had isolated the Army of Northern Virginia from the rest of the 
Confederacy and shut out even news from home from thousands 
of soldiers in its ranks. Hood's army had been driven from At- 
lanta and had battered itself to pieces in vain valor at Franklin, 
and then suffered rout at Nashville. Wilmington, Savannah and 
Charleston had fallen. The forlorn hope which Early had so long 
and gallantly led in the Valley of Virginia, had at last been driven 
from that land of historic memories. There was little of hope to 
sustain or cheer the grim veteran of the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia who starved and froze in the trenches, as the foe in front* 
whom he still beat back, fired shotted salutes into his lines to tell 
of victories won in other quarters.* 

Grant's soldiers suffered for nothing which money or the inge- 
nuity of man could supply, and had constant communication with 
homes, far from the track of war, where the munificence of a 
powerful government protected their families from want. They 
saw the circle of the hunt drawing closer around the Army of 
Northern Virginia, and conscious of the weight of numbers, had 
already caught the glow of victory and looked to the coming cam- 

*Such salutes were fired in honor of the victories at Atlanta, Winchester, Cedar 
Creek, Nashville, and the capture of Charleston and Savannah, and the fall of 
Fort Fisher. 



12 

paign, buoyed by the hope that it would crown their labors and 
sacrifices with glory in arms and victorious peace. 

In the other army, thinner and thinner grew its scant battal- 
lions, and wider and wider they were stretched to guard their long 
lines. Cold and hunger struck them down in the trenches, while 
from the desolate track of triumphant armies in their rear came 
the cries of starving and unprotected homes. From other 
fields, quickly succeeding each other, came the resounding crash of 
blows that shattered the fabric of the Confederacy all around them, 
save where their bayonets still upheld it. Misery sought the sol- 
diers of the Army of Northern Virginia by every avenue 
through which the heart of man can be reached. 

The coming campaign would only bring new and more power- 
ful foes upon its track, while it was yet too weak to drive off" the 
old foe in front. Even lion-hearted courage and resolve, could 
not shut out the thought from some, that all that they could give 
of life or blood might not ward off" disaster. To the reflecting Con- 
federate, the end, with all its attending miseries, indeed, seemed 
not far oft', and the strain upon the morale of an army of less 
sterner stuff", would have shriveled its .strength and melted it 
away before the shock came. And this is the crowning glory of 
that army that it neither faltered nor shrank even in the shadow 
of fate itself. Hope was well nigh hopeless. Duty and honor 
and the God-like bearing of its grey-haired chief alone sustained 
the Army of Northern Virginia during this long and desolate 
winter and spring. If the fickle and varying fortunes of war 
could not bring deliverance in the coming campaign, that army 
still believed it might at least wring other terms of peace than sur- 
render at discretion. It calmly awaited the issue, and contem- 
plated surrender only as the heroic Poniatowski, when he de- 
clared to those about him : '' Now, gentlemen, it becomes us 
to die with honor." 

About the middle of March, Sherman had established his large 
army about Goldsboro, North Carolina, some 145 miles south of 
Petersburg, and in the latter part of the month came to City 
Point, where he conferred with Grant. Sherman would be ready 
as soon as spring hardened the roads, to join his army with Grant's 
and make a combined attack on Lee, or he could act independently 
on Lee's line of communication at Burke ville Junction. One of 
these things he was sure to do. Johnston's small army could do 



13 

no more than impede Sherman's march. Lee was too weak to drive 
Grant from his front, and to remain where he was was to give his 
only line of retreat and supply to Sherman, and thus to be 
ground to pieces between the upper and nether mill-stones of his 
adversaries. The only hope was to leave the Petersburg lines, 
unite with Johnston, and strike a decisive blow at Sherman be- 
fore Grant could come to his assistance. This, of course, involved 
the evacuation of the Confederate capital, an event which Lee had 
long forseen and advised. For some reason the authorities at 
Richmond determined to postpone its abandonment to the last. 
Whether the Confederacy, under the cireumstances, could have 
survived, at any time during the last two years of the war, the loss 
of Richmond, with the tremendous political and military conse- 
quences which must follow, is a question upon which it is now 
idle to speculate. 

BATTLE OF HARE'S HILL, OR FORT STEADMAN. 

Gen. Lee resolved to try a bold stroke to revive the failing 
fortunes of the Confederacy. His design was, if possible, to de- 
stroy Grant's left wing, or failing in that, to make him so contract 
his left as not to embarrass the passage of the Confederate column 
South on its way to join Johnston's army near Greensboro. He 
resolved to attack Grant's line ac Ft. Steadman, which was near 
the Appomattox, about two miles distant from Petersburg. Here, 
the works of the two armies were about 150 yards apart, and the 
picket lines less than one-half that distance. This point gained, 
it w^as believed it would be easy to seize three forts on high 
ground that commanded Ft. Steadman and the enemy's retrench- 
ments on the right and left of it, and thus have a vantage ground 
from which to destroy Grant's left wing. Three columns of in- 
fantry were to follow the assaulting party, and capture these forts, 
and a division of infantry moving by its flank was to follow the 
storming columns, and when halted and fronted was to move down 
Grant's lines to his left, being successfully joined by the troops in 
Lee's trenches as their fronts were cleared. A brigade of cavalry was 
held in readiness to cut through the gap at Steadman, destroy the 
telegraph lines and the pontoon bridges over the Appomattox and 
spread demoralization in the rear of the lines. Gen. Gordon was se- 
lected to command the attack, and there were put under his orders, 
in addition to his own corps, a portion of Hill's, and a small brig- 



14 

ade, or detachment of cavalry ; a division from Longtreet was also 
to report to him. From the best information now available, the 
troops put under Gordon's orders amounted to about 14,000 men. 

About 5 o'clock on the morning of the 25th of March, the picket- 
guard and picket line in our front were quietly seized almost with- 
out the firing of a gun, and the storming columns broke the main 
line between batterries 9 and 10, and turning to the right and the 
left gained battery 10, overpowered the garrison at Ft. Steadman, 
capturing the greater part of it, and turned ifs artillery and that 
in battery 10 against the enemy. Batteries 11 and 12 were also 
captured. Some of our troops reached the military railroad 
and telegraph about a mile and a half in rear of Ft. Steadman, but 
the commander of one of the storming columns was wounded, 
and the guide of another column lost his way. The forts to be 
attacked were found to be of different character than at first sup- 
posed, and required a change of disposition for proper at- 
tack. The result was that the attacks upon the three forts were 
disjointed, and although gallantly made were repulsed with 
loss. Owing to the breaking down of the railroad, or other cause, 
the troops from Longstreet did not arrive on the field, in time. 
Waiting for them delayed the attack nearly an hour, so that when 
made the plan of operation against these forts could not be exe- 
cuted before daylight, as had been intended. 

The enemy after the first alarm and surprise quickly 
concentrated and in an hour or so our troops were driven 
into Ft. Steadman — Hare's Hill as it is called in the 
Confederate accounts — and the space immediately around it, 
although they had handsomely repulsed several of the first at- 
tempts to drive them from the captured works.* In this last posi- 

*In a short time, probably less than an hour after the first alarm was given 
Gen. Tidball, commanding the artillery of the 9th corps, concentrated a number 
of field pieces on the hills in rear of Ft. Steadman. about midway between it and 
Meade's Station, and opened a very savage fire. Hartranft's division which lay 
in reserve, the greater portion not being more than a mile and a half in rear of 
Steadman, was promptly marched to the rescue, and Gen. Hartranft, using the 
first troops which came up, made at great sacrifice two attacks on our troops out- 
side the fort, to delay their deployment. He was repulsed in these with heavy 
loss, but the effort was worth all it cost. It was Tidball's fire, Hartranft's attacks 
and the cross-fire of Haskell and McGilery, which prevented the timely deploy- 
ment of the Confederate troops, after Ft. Steadman fell, and not any lack of spirit 
of our men. 



15 

tion they were subjected to a pittiless cross-fire of artillery and 
small arms to which they could not effectually reply. The situation 
of the troops who had entered the Union lines was now desperate. 
Gen. Lee, who watched the battle near Cemetery Heights, con- 
curred with Gordon that the troops must be speedily withdrawn, 
and the latter despatched a staff officer to the different com- 
manders lo direct their men to run back in squads and get into 
the Confederate lines as best they could. This was effected with- 
out any counter attack in front of Steadman. The Confederate 
loss in this battle was nearly thirty-five hundred, and the enemy's 
a little over one thousand. Gen. Gordon captured and brought 
back 560 !nen including Brig. Gen. McLaughlin and two Coehorn 
mortars. Thus failed a brilliant stroke which promised great re- 
sults. The troops had fought with vigor and determination, and 
the failure of the attack was due to untoward circumstances or 
chance, which cannot always be guarded against in war. 

THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE TROOPS. 

A northern and a southern writer both take a different view of 
the conduct of the troops here and assert that it demonstrated a 
loss of their old time fire and vigor, and that they could no longer 
be depended upon for vigorous offensive movement.* These opin- 
ions are superficial, and based .upon the erroneous accounts which 
at first appeared and were generally accepted as true, because the 
later and better information was not gathered, but actually lost 

*Such an assertion would never have been made by any one who witnessed the 
bearing of the men while under fire or the conduct of the large portion of the troops 
on that bleak March night, as they tramped after midnight through the tomb- 
stones and graves of "the cemetery" to take position and await the order of assault. 
The darkness was little relieved by moon or stars. The hum of voices in this city 
of the dead was low, and the movement of armed bodies through it almost as 
noiseless and shadowy as the flitting of ghosts, while the strokes of the neighboring 
clocks sounded on the still night air like the tolling of funeral bells. Here were 
seen men tying or pinning large strips of white cloth over their breasts and shoul- 
ders, much resembling the sashes pall-bearers sometimes wear, to enable the as- 
saulting columns to distinguish friend from foe when the enemy's works were 
entered. Those who thus arrayed themselves at midnight, in a graveyard, to 
prepare for assault, could not fail to be reminded by the solemn and wierd scene 
of death. The surroundings were indeed befitting a plunge into black death 
itself; yet none faltered or left the ranks, and the men were as cheerful as if waiting 
to return to their warm winter quarters. They never lost heart or courage, and 
were always equal to the offensive, and were still capable of anything. 



16 

sight of in the succession of disasters of greater magnitude during 
the next fortnight. 

Gordon carried into the enemys' lines not over eight thousand 
troops. Those ordered from Lougstreet did not arrive, the cavalry- 
remained in its position near the old Gas Works, and a portion 
of Gordon's men remained in his lines to await the time when, 
their fronts being uncovered, they could move to the attack. The 
troops engaged lost over one thousand in killed and wounded — 
more than one-ninth their numbers. They were more than "deci- 
mated" a term often used before our late war to describe fearful 
losses. True, nearly two thousand unwounded men surrendered 
in the trenches, when retaken in the final counter-charge, made 
about three hours after the Confederates took Ft. Steadman. The 
space actually captured from the enemy at this point did not 
give sufficient room for the deployment of all the troops, who 
entered the enemys' works, to avail themselves of the expected 
success of the three assaulting colums. While waiting the result 
of the attacks on Ft. Haskell, and Ft. McGilvry, and after these 
were repulsed, as well as during the several assaults made by the 
enemy to retake the captured lines held by the Confederates, the 
greater portion of Gordon's men were confined in a restricted 
space, and to escape the pitiless enfilading fire of cannon, mortars 
and small arms which swept not only the flanks but both sides 
of the captured works, had often to seek cover in the rear of these 
works, or the side nearest the enemy, because the original front 
or side nearest Confederate lines, was literally torn up by the 
enemys' shot and shell. During the greater part of the three 
hours, elapsing between the capture and recapture of Steadman,, 
these troops had been under this heavy fire, from which they could 
not find shelter and to which they could not effectively reply, and 
were all the while obedient to orders and displaying the most un- 
flinching courage. *Their conduct was indeed splendid. Their 
situation, as we have seen, became so distressing that the officers 
were ordered to make their men run out of the works in squads, 
and get back into their own lines as best they could. It required 
considerable time to communicate the order from the several 

*Gen. Lee, in a dispatch sent to the Secretary of War at ll:20 p. m. that day, 
says: "All the troops engaged, including two brigades under Brig. Gen. Ransom, 
behaved most handsomely. The conduct of the sharp-shooters of Gordon's corps, 
who led the assault, deserves the highest commendation." 



Division Head-quarters down to the men through their respective 
Brigade and Regimental commanders. In several instances, 
staff officers bearing these orders were shot down, and the orders 
were rot communicated and had to be repeated. The smoke and 
noise of the artillery, mortars and small arms, whose fire was con- 
centrated on the few acres around Steadman occupied by the 
Confederate troops, was so great that it was difficult either to see 
or to hear at any distance. Many of the captured troops undoubt- 
edly never received the order, and fought the enemy in front, not 
knowing that their comrades had left until they received a fire 
from the flank and rear, which cut off flight and forced surrender. 
Most of the commands, however, had received the order before 
the countercharge began, and it burst upon the Confederates just 
as their line of battle, in several places, was leaving the captured 
works, and had turned their backs upon the enemy to regain our 
own retrenchments. Under these circumstances, the number 
taken prisoners was not exceptionally large compared to the num- 
ber engaged, and it does not at all sustain the verdict that the 
troops did not fight well, or that their morale had been so impaired 
that they could no longer be relied on for offensive movements. 

grant's counter movement. 

General Meade thinking the Confederate line, owing to the 
concentration at Steadman, must be weak on our right, furiously 
attacked the Confederate lines at several places, but with the ex- 
ception of the capture of an entrenched picket line in front of 
Gen. Wright's corps met with little success. Our loss in these 
affairs was about one thousand and the enemy's is believed to 
be about the same. 

The situation of the Confederate army was now indeed disheart- 
ening, for Grant could leave as strong a force as Lee had, in 
Grant's works, which were stronger than Lee's, and thus hold or con- 
tain Lee within his own lines and be free to. use twice Lee's num- 
bers in the unfortified country upon his flank. To meet such a dis- 
position of Grant's troops, which was sure to be made, Lee's only 
resource was to strip his already threadbare lines, leaving them to 
be held by a thin skirmish line, and form a column with the re- 
mainder of his troops with which to strike at the enemy's flanking 
columns. Grant, indeed, had already issued preparatory orders for 



18 

a general movement upon Lee's right the day before the attack 
upon Fort Steadman. 

At this time Gen. Hill held the right of Lee's line from Hatch- 
ers Jtlun to Battery Gregg. The 2nd corps, Gordon's troops, held 
from Battery Gregg to the Appomattox River, while Longstreet 
occupied the trenches north of the Appomattox to the extreme 
left on White Oak Swamp. From right to left the Confederate 
line of works was about 37 miles in length.* 

On the 28th March Sheridan was ordered to move next day 
with his 13,000 cavalry towards Dinwiddle Court House, attack 
the rear and right of Lee if practicable, while the 2nd and 5th 
corps, 35,000 strong together, guarded the interval between 
Sheridan and left of Grant's line. After this, Sheridan was in- 
structed to cut loose and push for the Danville road and act as 
circumstances might require. The 2d and 5th corps, Humphreys 
and Warren's, were at the same time instructed to press close up 
to the Confederate lines, so as to keep the defending force with 
them and also to reach around and attack its flank if possible. 
Gen. Ord, commanding the Army of the James, taking half of 
his army from the north side of the river, in all about 19,000 men, 
made a secret march on the night of the 27th and took position 
in the rear of the 2d corps, relieving it from its position in the 
trenches. The 6th corps, under Gen. Wright, numbering over 
19,000 men, and the 9th corps, under Gen. Parke, of about the 
same strength, remained in the trenches south of Petersburg, with 
instructions to assault if they found the force in their front greatly 
weakened, or if more advantageous for Parke to extend so as to 
allow the 6th corps to be withdrawn to join in the turning move- 
ment. A heavy rain fell on the night of the 29th, which greatly 
embarrassed the movements of both armies. 

ACTIONS ON WHITE OAK ROAD AND AT DINWIDDIE. 

Lee early divining the purpose of the enemy, sent Gen'l An- 
derson with Bushrod Johnson's division and Wise's brigade, to 
the extreme right of his entrenchments along the White Oak 

*Humphre_ys says, p. 310: "In the spring of 1865, when these works were com- 
pleted, the Confederate entrenchments were thh-tj-seven miles in length from the 
White Oak Swamp on their left to the Claiborne road crossing of Hatcher's run 
on their right. This length is not measured along the irregularities of the general 
line of intrenchments, much less those of the parapet lines." 



19 

road, on the morning of the 29th, and Pickett's division which 
had been relieved from the Bermuda Hundreds by Mahone, was 
transferred to the same point about day-light on the 30th. Gen. 
Hill, commanding the Confederate corps on the right, stretched 
his lines still thinner so as to add to the force confronting Hum- 
phreys and Warren. Gen. Lee ordered Fitz Lee's cavalry to Five 
Forks, and they arrived in the vicinity of Sutherland's station on 
the night of the 29th, the object of the concentration being to at- 
tack Sheridan and drive him back. Pickett's Division was about 
3,600 strong ; Johnson's 3,000 ; the cavalry of the two Lee's 
about 4,000; making, with some other troops, a total of 
about thirteen thousand for the moveable column, with which 
Lee hoped to strike some weak place in Grant's armor, and 
crush his flanking force as he had so often done before.* These 
forces of Lee were concentrated at Five Forks on the evening of 
the 30th of March. Gen. Lee struck the exposed flank ot the 
5th corps and drove back two of its divisions with the brigades 
of McGowan„Gracie, Hunton and Wise, but the ground was 
wooded, and the 3d Division of Warren's corps coming to his as- 
sistance, the retreat of his other two divisions was stopped, while 
an attack by Humphrey on the left of Wise's brigade, which was 
the extreme left of the Confederate attacking force, compelled 
the retirement of the Confederate force to their intrenchments. 

Foiled in the attempt to destroy the 5th corps, and paucity of 
numbers constraining him. to be cautious, Lee next attempted 
the destruction of Sheridan's force, which was widely separated 
from the Federal infantry. Sheridan, appreciating the value of 
Five Forks, had temporarily taken possession of it, while the 
Confederate infantry had been engaged with Warren, but Lee 
moved Pickett and Bushrod Johnson over the White Oak road 
to Five Forks, and drove the Federal cavalry in disorder on Din- 
widdle Court House, and isolated a portion of the force from Sher- 
idan's main line at Dinwiddle. The Confederate infantry and 
cavalry then assailed Sheridan's main body at Dinwiddle C. H. 
and handled it severely. There is much ground for believing, as 

*This is the best estimate I can make with the data at hand. One of Pickett's 
brigades had not reached him, and Anderson's whole division was not present. 
Of the cavalry reported February 20th, 1865, a large number were dismounted. 
Gen. Pickett estimates the total force as considerably less than stated in the text. 



20 

the Confederates claim, that night probably prevented the de- 
struction of this force. 

FIVE FORKS AND PETERSBURG LINES. 

Grant on learning the situation, was very anxious about Sher- 
idan, and subordinated all his movements to his relief. About 
midnight on the 31st, Pickett's position being isolated, all the 
troops which had been operating against Sheridan, were with- 
drawn to Five Forks by Gen'l Lee. Sheridan followed with the 
5th corps and the cavalry under his command and about 3 o'clock 
in the eveningofAprillst, masking the movement of the infantry 
by his cavalry, succeeding in getting the 5th corps in on the left of 
the Confederate works, and, in spite of the efforts of officers and 
men, almost surrounded and routed the greater portion of Pickett's 
and Johnson's troops, which vainly endeavored to change front to 
meet his attack. The Confederate loss in this action was not less 
than 4,700.* The fragments of Pickett's command, with some 
troops sent by Gen'l Lee to cover their retreat, took position at 
Sutherland station. The Confederate force in the trenches in the 
Petersburg lines was now a mere picket line, the men being from 
five to seven yards apart, and at dawn on Sunday the 2nd, Grant 
ordered Parke, Wright and Ord to assault. With the exception of 
three places in front of Petersburg, Gordon held his lines, but the 
6th and 2d corps brushed through the cob-web force in front of 
them, and swept up and down the Confederate lines from Hatch- 
er's Run to the inner lines around Petersburg. At this time Gen. 
Hill, who had been at Lee's headquarters, perceiving the commotion 
in his lines, and not knowing the extent of the disaster rode for- 
ward, and was shot dead by some of the enemy's skirmishers, 
who preceded an advance which was then bearing in the direc- 
tion of the Turnbull house, where Gen. Lee had his headquarters. 
Thus fell, at a time when most needed, an heroic soldier, 
whose name is honored wherever the army of Northern 
Virginia is known. At Battery Gregg, held by a mixed com- 
mand, mainly Mississippians, about two hundred and fifty strong, 
Ord's forces were detained an hour, and though 
he threw overwhelming numbers against the fort, it 

*Col. Taylor states it 1,300 more. See discussion further on, under head "Num- 
bers, Losses," &c., and note, as to number captured there. 



21 

did not surrender until its 250 defenders had been reduced to 30, 
and inflicted a loss of nearly 800 upon their assailants. This delay 
gave time to arrange for the defense of the inner line. 

For some reason Longstreet did not perceive the weakening of the 
force in his front at the time of Ord's withdrawal, and hence had not 
moved over to the south side of the river as instructed in that event, 
but about 10 a. m., on April 2, some of his brigades reached Peters- 
burg, and with these an attack was made upon the 9th corps, 
which together with these Gordon made, to recapture a part of his 
hue, were so fierce that the garrison from City Point had to be 
ordered up. The Confederate forces now held the line from Kich- 
mond to Petersburg, and in that city, and an inner line, the right 
of which rested upon the Appomatox. In this position it was 
able to resist all attacks until darkness came to its relief. 

ORDERS FOR THE RETREAT. 

When the Confederate lines were carried, orders were given for 
the evacuation of Richmond, and the concentration of the army 
at Amelia Court House. Gen. Anderson was directed to move 
up along the Appomattox to Amelia Court House, and he was 
joined on the road by the remnants of Pickett's command and 
some troops of Hill's corps under Gen. Cooke, who handsomely re- 
pelled with severe loss two attacks on him near Sutherland's Sta- 
tion by Gen. Miles; but Miles was reinforced, and by a third at- 
iack succeeded in forcing these troops from the field in 
some confusion. The rear was covered by Fitz-Lee, whose cav- 
alry had done brilliant service in the action at Five Forks, and m 
stemming the pursuit undertaken by Sheridan's cavalry after the 
Confederate infantry had broken. 

THE MORALE OF THE TROOPS. 

The troops who left the Petersburg lines on the retreat with 
Lee were of no ordinary mould. Each was a veteran of years of 
terrible war and trial, the survivor of many a bloody battle. 
They had experienced victories without undue elation, and bore 
disaster and suffering without being cast down. They remained" 
with their colors when the faint-hearted and selfish fell by the 
way- side, because of a deep conviction of the justice and necessity 
of their cause, and were sustained by a high sense of duty and 



22 

personal pride which ecorned discharge unless it came through 
victory or by death or wounds. The larger portion of them had 
an abiding faith, amounting almost to fanaticism, that the God of 
Battles would, in the end, send their cause sale deliverance, and 
they followed Lee with an almost child-like faith, which set no 
bounds to his genius and power of achievement. They did not 
doubt that he would unite with Johnston and destroy Sherman 
and then turn on Grant; or else take up a new line and hold 
Grant at bay, until the country in the rear rallied and gave Lee 
power to resume the offensive. The power of the South to in- 
definitely prolong the struggle by partisan war if its main armies 
were compelled to disperse, was a belief fostered by the traditions 
of the Revolution, and largely pervaded the ranks. It was a 
general thought among these men that long continued resist- 
ance, and the burdens it would entail upon the invader, as well 
as the blows of Confederate arms, would finally wring recognition 
and peace from the United States. Such was the frame of mind of 
most of these men as they turned their backs upon the Confederate 
capital ; and while they were too intelligent not to appreciate the 
extent of the disaster, they entered upon the retreat with good 
heart and undoubted morale. The men had been so long cooped 
up in the trenches, that their march into the open fields and woods, 
on the night of April 2d. was as exhilarating to them as cool 
breezes and sun-light to one long confined in the close air of a dark 
dungeon. These things explain the almost bouyant spirit of 
Lee's troops on that fateful night. The belief that the retreat 
would possibly end in surrender entered the minds of few. 
While the final result would probably not have been altered if 
Lee had made a junction with Johnston, it is certain if there had 
been food to sustain the bodies of these mei^, their unquenched 
courage would have written a difi"erent history for the retreat 
from the Petersburg lines. 

MOVEMENTS TO APRIL 5tH. 

Longstreet crossed the Appomattox at Pochahontas Bridge, 
and moved along the north side of the river, intending to 
re-cross at Bevil's Bridge, but that being out of repair, 
used the pontoon at Goode's Bridge. Gordon taking the 
Hickory road, le-crossed at Goode's Bridge, and Kershaw 



23 

and Custis Lee's divisions, comprising Swell's command 
at Richmond, crossed the James at Richmond and moving on the 
Genito road followed by Gary's cavalry, crossed the Appomattox 
on the Danville Railroad Bridge. Grant sent Sheridan 
and the 5th corps to move on the south side of the river, to 
follow Lee's army and strike the Danville road between its crossing 
of the Appomattox and the crossing of the Lynchburg road at Burk- 
ville Junction. Gen. Meade himself, with the 2nd and 6tb corps, 
followed with the same general instructions, and Ord's command 
was ordered to move along the south side of the railroad to Burke- 
ville Junction, followed by the 9th corps. 

It will be seen that the 5th infantry corps and Sheridan's cav- 
alry, on the morning of the 3rd were in position to cut off Lee's 
retreat by the south bank of the Appomattox. 

Longstreet reached Amelia Court House on the afternoon of 
the 4th. Gordon's commajid was three or four miles distant, and 
Mahone's division was still near Goode's Bridge. Ewell's com- 
mand arrived about 12 o'clock, and Anderson and Fitz-Lee's cav- 
alry on the morning of the 5th. For some reason the expected sup- 
plies at Amelia were not there, and hunger and fatigue told fear- 
fully upon the men who had but one ration since the retreat com- 
menced. In order to obtain food foraging parties were sent out, 
and Lee was detained at Amelia on the 4th, and a large part of 
the 5th of April. Thus precious time was lost and the last oppor- 
portunity to strike at Grant's widely scattered pursuing columns. 
Meanwhile, Sheridan, on the afternoon of the 4th, had struck the 
Danville road at Jetersville, seven miles southwest of Amelia C.H- 
and entrenched. Lee's infantry at this time did not amount to 
25,000 fighting men, and as Sheridan's cavalry was entrenched at 
Jetersville and had been reinforced by the 5th corps,it equalled, if it 
did not exceed Lee's whole army, and Lee, who had advanced to- 
wards Jetersville on the afternoon of the 5th with the view of at- 
tacking Sheridan, if he had not been too heavily reinforced by 
infantry, had no alternative but to at'tempt to march around 
him. Lee still hoped that by a vigorous night march westward, he 
might get far enough in advance to reach Lynchburg, by passing 
through Deatonsville, Rice's Station and Farmville, and perhaps 
get to Danville. 



24 

NO FOOD AT AMELIA. — TRIALS OF THE RETREAT. 

The disappointment at not finding the expected supplies at 
Amelia threw a great damper upon the spirits of the famishing 
troops ; but they did not quail hut only girded their loins the 
tighter to meet the fearful ordeal ahead of them. When the 
army moved, after the inevitable halt at Amelia, it was to pass 
through a circle of fire. An immense amount of war material 
had accumulated at Richmond and Petersburg, and if the army 
was to have another campaign much of it must be transported in 
wagons; for the Confederates had no other suppplies and without 
them the army was lost. The country roads on which these 
trains must move were narrow, rough and softened by the heavy 
spring rains. Every rivulet had swollen into a stream and ever}'^ 
little creek needed to be bridged. The immense caravan of 
wheels converted every depression in the roads into a hole and 
turned the roads into a perfect sea of mud through which the 
supply trains and amunition wagons, artillery and ambu- 
lances struggled on to reach dry land beyond, almost as vainly 
as Pharoah's army in the Red iSea. Although the trains moved 
on different roads and the wagons were driven two and three 
abreast wherever practicable, they were often longer than 
the line of the troops which marched on their flank for 
their protection.* A formidable cavalry force swarmed upon the 
flanks and sometimes the front and rear was attacked by infantry. 
The shield of protection for these trains, which the marching 
troops could afford was thin indeed, and constant thrusts at 
it by the cavalry soon exposed its weak points. Through these 
the cavalry charged spreading death and dismay among the sick 
and wounded and helpless throngs which accompanied the trains.f 

*Stieridan's cavalry, including McKenzie, numbered over 15,000 effective offi- 
cers and ir.en on 29th March. This force made more than three times the num- 
ber of effective Confederate cavalry at that time. 

tHumphreys says, p. 375: "The roads were very heavy owing to the copious 
rains, and in fact were ttearly impassible for wagon trains." The horses and 
mules were in very low condition from'lhe winter's exposure and scant provender, 
and, having little forage on the retreat, were constantly falling in harness from 
exhaustion and weakness. There was almost sure to be a serious delay from this 
cause whenever the trains reached a steep hill or a muddy lane. Horsesand men 
alike, in the last days of the retreat, fell from exhaustion and misery and perished 
en the road-side. With them were often mingled dead and dyirag soldiers who 
fell in attempting to defend the trains against cavalry, which dashed in to attack 
wherever the wagons moved without heavy escort. 



25 

Many times the first warnings the infantry had of these dashes 
was the explosion of ammunition and the smoke of burning 
wagons. The rear guard resisted to the last from every ad- 
vantageous hill and every coin of vantage, to gain time for the 
balky trains to move on. Often it was driven from position while 
the long trains were not yet out of sight and the enemy's batteries 
thundered forth destruction into the trains which, spread out for 
miles in the road, presented a tempting mark at which not a shot 
could be thrown in vain. During the last days of the retreat, at- 
tack came from every quarter and the days and nights alike were 
spent in marching and fighting. There was not time or opportunity 
for sleep and of food there was none. Suspense, despair, exposure, 
famine, and want of sleep caused many whose weak bodies could 
not sustain their dauntless souls to lie down on the road side to 
await the coming of death. Many were not strong enough to 
carry their muskets and placed them in the wagon trains while they 
marched beside them, hoping that food and rest, when these could 
be obtained, would again enable them to bear ar ms. 

On the morning of the 6th, the army of the Potomac, which had 
been mainly concentrated at Jetersville,moved northward to Ame- 
lia C.H. to give battle to Lee, but he had passed, as we have seen, 
on the night before on the Deatonsville road. Humphrey's 2nd 
corps was ordered to move on the Deatonsville road, and the 5th and 
6th corps in parallel directions on the right and left. The Army of 
the James, under Ord, had in the meantime, reached Burkeville, 
and on the 6th Gen. Ord was directed towards Farmville. Meade 
discovered Lee's withdrawal from Amelia before reaching that 
point, and made new dispositions for pursuit. The 2nd corps 
soon came up with Gordon in the rear and a sharp, running fight 
commenced with Gordon's corps, which continued nearly all day. 
An obstinate stand was made at Sailor's Creek, but the numbers 
of the enemy enabled them to turn Gordon's position, and take 
some high ground commanding it, and just at night-fill his posi- 
tion was carried with a loss of a battery, several hundred 
prisoners and hundreds of wagons, which had become blocked up 
at the crossing of the creek near Perkinson's Mill. The 6th corps 
meantime had come up with Ewell, and while the cavalry 
detained it in the rear and on the flank, it was attacked and sur- 
rounded by the 6th corps and, after oi^e of the most gallant fights 
of the war, compelled to surrender. Ewell had about 9000 men 



26 

all told, and about 6000 of these were killed, wounded or captured, 
including Gen. Ewell and five other general oflScers made pris- 
oners. Geu. Read, of Ord's staff, with Col. Washburn and a force 
of 80 cavalry and about 500 infantry, had been sent to destroy the 
high bridge, but they were intercepted about mid-day on the 6th 
by Kosser and Mumford, and after a severe fight in which Head 
and Washburn were killed and number of the men also, the 
remainder surrendered. 

Gordon's command reached this side of High Bridge, near 
Farmville, that night, Longstreet, whose command had halted 
all that day at Rice's Station to enable the other corps to unite 
with them, marched that night on Farmville, and on the morning 
of the 7th moved out on the road passing through Appomattox 
C. H. and Lynchburg. Here rations were issued for the first time 
since the 2d April.* Gordon's troops and Mahone's crossed the 
High Bridge on the morning of the 7th. The 2d corps (Hum- 
phrey's) followed Ixard behind Gordon. Four miles north of 
Farmville, Gen'l Lee being hotly pressed, chose a favorable posi- 
tion covering the stage and plank roads to Lynchburg, threw up 
temporary breastworks and brought batteries in position. Hum- 
phreys attacked, but was repulsed with considerable loss. Sheridan 
that day sent his cavalry to Prince Edward C. H., with the excep- 
tion of one division which was sent to Farmville. On the night 
of the 7th Lee marched nearly all night, and was followed by the 
2d and 6th corps of the army of the Potomac up the north bank 
of the Appomattox, while Sheridan, followed by Ord and the 5th 
corps, advanced by the south bank and struck Appomattox station 
on the Lynchburg road. 

On the evening of the 8th, Lee's advance was in the vicinity of 
Appomattox O. H., and there was reason to fear that the enemy's 
formidable cavalry force would reach it first and intervene between 
Lee and Lynchburg road, which was the only outlet left the Con- 
federate commander. Longstreet's command was in the rear, 
closely pressed by Meade's army. Between Longstreet and Gor- 
don was an innumerable caravan of wagons, artillery, disabled 
and unarmed men. 

■*The advance of the enemy was so close that the wagons could not be held long 
enough to supply many of the troops. 



27 



THE NIGHT BEFORE THE SURRENDER. 

Near dusk on the 8th of April, Sheridan's cavalry, on the out- 
skirts of Appomattox court house, captured several pieces of artil- 
lery, which were moving without escort ahead of the army, on 
the road to Lynchburg, and several train loads of supplies sent to 
feed Lee's army. Our infantry was not yet up, and worn and scat- 
tered as the troops were after a long march, it was impossible to 
concentrate sufficient force to attack that night.* Whatever was 
in front must be driven in the morning, for our army was now on 
the narrow strip of country between the Appomattox and James 
rivers, and the road to Lynchburg was the only line of retreat. 

Lee resolved to cut through Sheridan's force, and Gordon, who 
had for several days covered the rear, was ordered to the front to 
head the movement. All that remained of the- old second 
corps and of Ewell and Anderson's troops were sent to him. 
Mahone was to move on the left of our line of march, pro- 
tecting it and the trains. Col. Thos. H. Carter, with a number 
of his best guns, was to support the attack of Gordon, while Fitz- 
hugh Lee who had been recently assigned to the command of all 
the cavalry was to move with the cavalry on the infantry right. 
Longstreet was to protect the wagon train and hold back the 
enemy in the rear. The column of attack thus made up to cut 
through Sheridan consisted of about two thousand five hundred 
muskets and about 2,200 cavalry. Upon this force depended the 
salvation of the army.f . 

*Gen. Lindsay Walker's artillery was attacked on the evening of the 8th near 
Appomattox Station, but the attack was repulsed. Some of the enemy's cavalry 
dashed in that sa^Tie evening near the court- house, but were held in check by some 
of our cavalry. 

tGen. Humphreys, who compiles the figures from official records, states the 
number of cavalry paroled at Appomattox at 1786. Long makes it about two 
hundred less. The estimate abovegives about four hundred more. The cavalry 
cut through on the 9th, and some of them left for their homes, after it was known 
the army had surrendered, without waiting to be paroled with their commands 
when Gen. Fitz Lee surrendered the cavalry a short time afterwards. Gen. 
Robt. E. Lee, in his letter announcing the surrender to President Davis, says, "I 
have no accurate report of the cavalry, but believe it did not exceed 2,100 effective 
men." Hence, I have felt justified in estimating the number participating in the 
action on the morning of April 9ih, as greater than the number paroled. 

"Gordon's Corps" at Appomattox included the old 2d corps and what was left 
of Anderson and Ewell's commands, and surrendered 6,773 enlisted men, including 



28 

The tired Confederates eaiik down to rest just as they halted. 
The troops had neither food nor sleep, and were too weak and 
weary to build fires. 

THE ATTEMPT TO CUT OFT. 

About half past live, on Sunday April 9th, Gordon who had 
formed his command nearly a half a mile from the court-house, 
advanced his line. A proud array it was, although the men were 
so worn, jaded and famished, that many could hardly carry their 
muskets. Divisions had dwindled to the number of full regiments 
and regiments and companies were represented by a few files of 
men ; but the colors of nearly all of the organizations remained.* 

The sharp skirmish fire soon grew into a furious and heavy 
volume of musketry. The ever faithful Carter joined in with his 
deep toned guns. The cavalry on our right pressed forward at a 
gallop, and wild and fierce shouts resounded throughout the heav- 

the detailed men of all the various organizations composing the corps, such as 
teamsters, ordnance, ambulance drivers, etc. The detailed men amounted to at 
least 1,500, for we had not only the usual proporti)n for the force present, but con- 
siderably more, since the detailed men of Ewell and Anderson's forces, which 
were so terribly handled at Sailor's Creek, were not captured in the same propor- 
tion as its fighting strength. Deducting the number of detailed men, who are not 
available for line of battle duty, would giv^e Gordon about 5,000 infantry men. 
Over half of these were too weak to bear their muskets and 40 rounds of ammuni- 
tion. The strength of the infantry under Gordon in the attack is therefore placed 
at "about 2 500," which corresponds with the recollection of Gen. Gordon and 
other officers at the time. 

*That this statement is not an exaggeration becomes quite evident when we 
take the number paroled and bear in mind that it includes the detailed men, and 
that over half the infantry were too weak to bear arms on the morning of April 
9th. The 2d corps, composed of the divisions of Grimes, Early and Gordon, 
paroled 4,456 enlisted men, exclusive of provost guard. &c., their numbers being 
respectively 1,727, 1,117 and 1,612. Deducting 60 per cent, of this number for de- 
tailed men, not available for battle, and the proportion of men who were physi- 
cally unable to bear arms, these divisions were represented in the column of at- 
tack about as follows: Grimes', 688 muskets; Early's, 444; Gordon's, 644, — none 
of them having more than the strength of a full regiment. In the second corps 
alone some sixty-four regimental organizations were represented, and, as the 
figures show, they did not average thirty muskets in line. The showing in the 
cavalry was about the same. While the corps lost some flags in battle, and fre- 
quently when regiments became exceedingly small they did not carry their colors 
in line, yet the number of colors carried that day, including those ot Anderson's 
troops, was out of all proportion to the number of men, 3nr) 'nide the line appear 
"almost scarlet." 



29 

ens. As the sun drove away that Sunday morniTig mist, it looked 
down upon a scene that will forevermore thrill Southern hearts. 
In a steady line, sustained on the left by artillery, which flamed 
forth at every step, with cavalry charging fiercely on the right, 
the Confederate line of battle, scarlet almost from the array of 
battle flags floating over it, went forth to death, driving before 
it masses of blue cavalry and artillery.* Spring was just budding 
forth, and the morning sun glistening from budding leaf and tree, 
shed a halo about the red battle flags with the starry cross, as if 
nature would smile on the nation that was dying there. We 
pressed on and beyond the court house. Fitz Lee and his 
cavalry rode unmolested on the Lynchburg road, but Gordon's 
infantry was impeded by a desperate resistance. Gordon's men 
captured a battery, and still pressed on. It was too late. The 
''infantry under Ord" nearly 30,000 strong, now filed across our 
pathway, throwing out batteries from every knoll, and rapidly 
advanced lines of infantry against us.f Gordon could not with- 
stand Vhat was in front, and to stop to resist it, would be to in- 
volve his flank and rear in clouds of enemies. Slowly this glorious 
color guard of the "Army of Northern Virginia" retraced it steps 
to Appomattox C. H , bringing with it prisoners and captured 
artillery. The probable success of Gordon's movement and what 
was to be done in event of failure, had been the subject of dis- 
cussion between Gen. Lee and his corps commanders. While 
Gordon was falling back he received a notification from Gen. Lee 
that he had sent a flag through the lines to seek an interview^ 
with Gen. Grant, and Gordon thereupon sent flags which Sheridan 
and Ord received asking a cessation of hostilities in his front un- 
til the meeting could be had. 

While this was going on, Longstreet had been closely pressed 
by the troops in rear and flags of truce were also sent out from his 
lines requesting a cessation of hostilities on Gen'l Meade's front. 

*Sheridan says his cavalry fell back slowly in accordance with orders. Ord 
says, "in spite of Sheridan's attempts the cavalry was falling back in confusion 
before Lee's infantry." Crook says, "the cavalry was forced to retire by over- 
whelming numbers until relieved by infantry, when we reorganized." Merritt 
and Custer say the same thing. 

tGen. Ord thinks his advance was made about ten o'clock. It was. however, a 
few minutes after 9 o'clock. 



30 

Lee's last prop had fallen Irom under him when Gordon was 
driven back, and surrender was all that was lelt. It is not prac- 
tical within the limits of an address like this to describe all the 
events connected with the surrender. Its minutest incidents have 
already passed into history, which has long since exploded the 
stories of the "famous apple tree," and the tender by Lee of his 
sword and Grant's refusal to receive it. 

Whether he fought with the defeated or the victorious army, no 
American citizen can forget that Grant was generous in the hour 
of victory, and "displayed the delicacj'^ of a great soul" in dealing 
with his former foes, nor that Lee on that fateful day showed how 
"sublime it is to suffer and grow strong," and gave to the world 
an example of greatness in the hour of adversity that honors the 
American name forever more. I will not attempt to describe 
what Oiisued on Lee's return to his own lines when it was known 
that all was over. No pen or tongue can tell what he and the men 
who crowded around him felt, or picture the scene as he tlirned 
to leave them to go to his tent. Never before had unsuccessful 
leader received such homage from his surrendered legions, or more 
lespect from his foes. 

Grant's army made other captures here which are often forgotten. 
In the actions on the Petersburg lines, the affair near the 
High bridge in which Read's force was destroyed, and that 
in which Gen. Gregg was captured, and in other combats in tho 
retreat, Lee's army had plucked from its pursuers and safely 
guarded to Appomatox over fourteen hundred prisoners, including 
a battery of artillery and a Brigadier General of cavalry. 
These prisoners of the Army of Northern Virginia were 
of course freed by its surrender. The number of 
casualties in Grant's army from the commencement of 
the final movement to the surrender, which according to official 
reports amounted to 9,994 officers and men — or near one fourth 
of the Confederate strength at the beginning of the final struggle 
— bears striking testimony to the high courage of the retreating 
army. Its heroic endeavors are made still more conspicuous by 
the fact that the army of Northern Virginia, encumbered as it was 
with- immense trains, moving over bad country roads, perishing 
from exposure and lack of food, and fighting daily a vastly su- 
perior force, marched, on the routes taken by it, in the six days 



31 

from the night of April 2 to the morning of the 9th over eighty- 
five miles, or an average of about fourteen miles a day. Such 
marches of an army of its size, under such circumstances, have 
few if any parallels in military annals. 

On the 10th of April officers, made out muster-rolls of their 
commands in duplicate and then signed and gave them paroles, 
on printed blanks which had been struck off by the force of prin- 
ters gathered up from the head-quarters of the various 
Federal corps commanders. The Confederate troops then 
marched, brigade at a time, past an equal number of Federal 
troops, commanded, if my -memory is not at fault, by Gen. Cham- 
berlain, and stacked arms and banners. The Federal troops often 
presented arms to their foes, and uniformly treated them with 
the utmost respect. With this simple ceremony the surrender 
was over. 

NUMBERS — LOSSES — WHAT THEY PROVE. 

Lee's army, as will be remembered, numbered not over fifty 
thousand men of all arms when Grant commenced operations on 
the 29th of March. Lee lost in killed, wounded, captured and 
stragglers at least seven thousand men in the battle at Five Forks, 
and the encounters at other places on the 30th and 31st March, 
and the general assault on the lines on the morning of April 2nd 
cost Lee, from the same causes, at least seven thousand more ; so 
that he had only thirty-six thousand men of all arms for duty, in- 
cluding 2.500 dismounted cavalry, the artillery and the mounted 
cavalry, Ewell's command and the naval battalion, on the night 
of April 25th, or morning of the 3d, to take upon the retreat. He 
left the Petersburg line with about 26,000 infantry. 

In the desperate fighting of April 6th, when Ewell and Ander- 
son's commands were captured, and when Gordon, after engaging 
in a running fight for nearly 14 miles, was driven across Sailor's 
Creek, Lee lost about eight thousand men, including stragglers 
who were not captured. The cavalry was constantly figfiting for 
the protection of the wagon trains, and so was a portion of the 
infantry after the army left Amelia Court-House. There was 
also the action at Sutherland's Station, April 2d ; that at High 
Bridge, in which Reid's force was captured, and the fighting around 
Farmville, including the repulse of Humphrey, the aflairin which 



32 

Gen. Gregg was captured, and also the action on the 9th at the 
Court-House. The losses in all the actions which took place after 
the retreat was begun amounted to at least 12,000 men, and sub- 
tracting that number from the force with which Lee left the Pe- 
tersburg lines would leave about 24,000 men of all arms to be 
accounted for at Appomattox, exclusive of the force for Richmond 
and Danville defences of about 1,400 men. Some of this force 
joined Lee on the retreat and accompanied him to Appomattox, 
and if all are properly included in the number of troops to 
be accounted for there, it would make the total number 25,400. 
The total number surrendered at Appomattox, according to Gen. 
Humphreys was 28,536, and according to the figures furnished 
from the Adjutant General's office 27,416. This excess of between 
two and three thousand above the fighting force which the returns 
would give Lee, is accounted for by the fact that detailed men in 
the medical, ordnance, quartermaster, subsistence, engineer and 
provost departments of Lee's own army, who were not included in 
his line of battle strength, and some of the men detailed in the 
arsenals and various departments at Richmond who took part in 
the retreat, were also paroled at Appomattox. Any one conver- 
sant with the proportion that such details bear to the aggregate 
strength of an army will readily admit that this is a moderate 
estimate for the number of these non-combatants. 

These facts and figures eflfectually dispute the assertions which 
are sought to be palmed off" as the truth of history that Lee's army 
melted away along the retreat by regiments and scattered to their 
homes in advance of their pursuers. 

The fact, so well known to numbers of the survivors of the 
Army of Northern Virginia, that Lee had not quite eight thousand 
organized infantry with arms in their hands on the morning of 
April 9th, has been disputed or doubted by Northern writers, but 
its correctness is susceptible of most convincing proof. It will 
be remembered that in the last return of Lee's army 5,155 were 
artillery and 5,700 were cavalry. Owing to the fact that nearly 
one-half of the cavalry were dismounted, and remembering their 
losses in the actions in which they were engaged up to the 9th, it 
is safe to estimate Lee's effective cavalry at between two thousand 
and twenty-two hundred. This exceeds the number paroled, but 
Fitz Lee's cavalry cut through on the morning of the 9th, and a 



33 

portion left for their homes, after learning of the surrender, with- 
out waiting to be paroled when the cavalry surrendered shortly 
afterwards. Two thousand five hundred and eighty-six artillery- 
men were paroled. The cavalry and artillery on the morning of 
the 9th, therefore, numbered about forty-seven hundred men. As 
the number of troops with which Lee started on the retreat was 
36,000 of all arms, and the losses were 12,000, it would leave Lee 
24,000 of his line of battle strength of all arras on the day of the 
surrender. Deduct from this number forty seven hundred for 
artillery and cavalry, and it would give Lee 19,300, or if we in- 
clude Walker's command, 20,700 infantry on the morning of the 
surrendei. Is it any wonder that more than half of this number 
had not the strength to bear their muskets? It must be remem- 
bered, also, that the greater portion of Lee's troops had been 
fighting and marching, during most miserable weather, since the 
25th day of March, and that the whole of his force had been 
marching and fighting every day since the 1st day of April, and 
that during this trying period the troops had been without bufH- 
cient fojd most of the time, and for the last five days without 
food of any kind, sustaining themselves on leaves and twigs of the 
budding vegetation and a fev;^ ears of Indian corn left in the 
fields when the crops were gathered. This continuous exposure, 
fatigue, loss of sleep, and hunger, and the mental strain which the 
troops underwent, told fearfully upon them, and thousands of the 
infantry, whose courage was unquenched, were too weak to bear 
their muskets and had either to place them in the wagons or 
abandon them on the wayside So it was that over half of them 
were too weak to bear arms on the morning of the 9th, and Lee 
could then muster not quite eight thousand organized infantry 
with arms in their hands, for the operations on the front, fianks 
and rear of his army, while Gordon and Fitz Lee attempted to cut 
out. Gen. Lee, in his report to President Davis of the surrender, 
says: "On the morning of the 9th, according to the reports 
of the ordnance officers, there were 7,892 organized infantry 
with arms, with an average of 75 rounds of ammunition per 
man."* The wonder, under all the circumstances, is not that 
he had so few, but that he had so many muskets in line, 

*Humphreys does not deny the statement, or attempt to refute it. He remarks, 
if the statement is true, many of the infantry must have thrown away their muskets 
after the surrender became known. If documentary evidence existed, as to the 



34 



It will be noticed that the estimate of Lee's losses, from the 29th 
of March to April 9th, exceeds the number of prisoners, which 

number of men surrendered with arms in their hands at Appomattox, a writer of 
Humphreys' ability and great research, who had the aid of the War Department 
in making his investigations, would surely have found the evidence and cited it. 

Publications as to the number of armed men Lee surrendered', as will be seen 
from the extract below, had come to Gen. Grant's attention. He does not attempt 
to refute or deny them. He says "when Lee finally surrendered at Appomattox, 
there were only 28,356 officers and men left to be paroled, and many of these -were 
ivitkout arms. It was probably this latter fact [that many were without arms] 
which gave rise to the statement sometimes made, North and South, that Lee sur- 
rendered a smaller number of men than what the official figures show." — Me- 
moirs, Vol. 2, p. 500. 

Badean, however, attempts to be equal to the emergency. In a note of a singular 
venom and malignity, tor a soldier writing fifteenyears after the close of the war, 
he says : 

'•Every rebel who has written about Appomattox, declares that only 8.000 of 
those who surrendered bore arms — a statement which would not be creditable to 
them if true. But as every rebel who was at Appomattox was himself a prisoner, 
the assertion is worthless. The fact is that 22.633 small arms were surrendered; 
and Lee did not carry many extra muskets around on wagons during the retreat 
from Petersburg." Vol. 3, p. 624. 

One would infer from this paragraph that there were official reports, showing 
the number of small arms surrendered «/ Appomattox, If any such exist they 
have not yet been found, and the documentary evidence to which Badean refers, 
so far from disputing the Confederate statements, tends strongly to confirm them. 
Badean, vol. 3, p. 714 of his work, publishes the following: 

"STATEMENT OF CANNON AND SMALL ARMS SURRENDERED TO THE UNITED 
STATES FROM APRIL 8tH, TO DECEMBER 30tH, 1865. 



Date of Report 


Where Surrendered. 


Cannon 


Small 
Arms. 


Remarks. 


Anril 11, 1865 


Army of the James 


263 
251 


10,000 
22.633 


[ Lee's Army. 


May 31,1865.. 


\rmy of the Potomac .... 



* * * * [Here follow other places outside of Virginia.] 

The records of the ordnance office do not show from w-hat General the surren- 
dered arms, etc., wei-e received, except in the case of Johnston's army to Gen. 
Sherman. Ordnance office. War Department, Dec. 30th, 1880." 

The army of the James and the army of the Potomac were both under Grant in 
all his final movements and at Appomattox. There was little fighting or even 
skirmishing on the 8th of April, and no captures. The surrender took place next 
day, and it ended the war. Neither of these armies took part in any more fighting, 
and hence could not make any captures of arms after the 9th. It is inevitable, if 
these reports cover arms actually captured between the 8th of April and their 
respective dates, April 11th, May 31st, 1865, [instead of arms gathered up at Ap- 
pomattox and other places in Virginia by ordnance officers of those armies between 
those dates] that the captures were made at Appomattox and on the day before — 
ince there was no other time or place when captures could be nriade between 



35 

official records show Grant captured during that period, by nearly 
seven thousand men. Grant, in his Memoirs, states the number 

those dates. The "statement" covers the cannon and small arms; and if, as Ba- 
deau assumes, it proves the number of small arms surrendered at Appomattox, it 
equally proves the number of "cannon" surrendered. On Badeau's theory, the 
statement on its face shows that 514 cannon and 32,633 small arms were surren- 
dered at Appomattox. I have omitted from this statement the number of cannon 
reported September r2th, 1865, as surrendered at "Richmond and Petersburg," 
because the report does not include any small arms, and even Badeau would 
hardly contend that it referred to cannon captured at Appomattox. 

Why should Badean reject one of the returns, instead of taking both ? If his 
version is correct, that the reports cover arms actually captured after April 8th, he 
is certainly bound to take the report of April 11th, as showmg a part of the small 
arms surrendered at Appomattox, for between those dates the army of the James 
had been nowhere except at Appomattox and its vicinity; and there can be no 
reason for not adding that number to the small arms shown in the report of 
May 31st. Why he does not include the number in both reports, but rejects the 
first and takes the second, we will see presently. 

There are certain well known historical facts, which even Badean can not dis- 
pute. Lee at no one time during the existence of the army of Northern Vir- 
ginia, had as many as 514 pieces of field artillery. That number is about double 
the highest number he ever had. It is twice the number Lee had at the openiij^ 
of hostilities in the Wilderness in May, 1864, or in March, 1865, when Grant began 
his final operations. Besides, Lee lost some field pieces at Five Forks, when the 
Petersburg lines were swept to Hatchers run, at Sailors creek and other places 
on the retreat, to say nothing of the number of pieces dismantled and destroyed by 
Lee's order on the retreat, and those sent on ahead of the army. Lee himself 
reported to President Davis that he had only 63 field pieces at Appomattox. It is 
preposterous, therefore, to ask anybody to believe that Lee surrendered at Appo- 
mattox more field pieces than he had when he left Petersburg, and twice as many 
as his army ever had. So, if it is proper construction that these two reports are 
intended to give the number of "cannon" captured at Appomattox, it is proved 
by undisputable historical evidence, that they are monstrously false as to the 
number of "cannon," at least. 

How stands the case as to the 32,633 small arms reported, if Badeau's version is 
correct, and "Lee did not carry many extra muskets in wagons .'"' All these small 
arms, on Badeau's idea, must also have been captured at Appomattox, for as we 
have seen, there was no other place between the 8th of April and the dates of the 
reports where any captures could be made by either Meade's or Ord's army. If 
these small arms were captured at Appomattox, how did they get there .' Lee 
surrendered only 28,536 officers and men at Appomattox. Of this number at least 
5,500 were officers and detailed men, teamsters, etc., who did not carry muskets. 
This left only 23,000 men to bring 32,000 muskets to Appomattox, if every soldier 
whose duty it was to bear arms had been able to do so. It is not pretended that 
any of the infantry carried two muskets, or denied that many were unable to carry 
one. The 9,000 excess of muskets, if both reports are included in getting the num- 
ber of small arms, is what disturbed Badean; and he iliogically rejects one report, 



36 

at 19,132, and the records of the Adjutant General's office give 
the same figures. The diflerence in number must consist in the 

and then takes the other solely because the number of small arms the latter reports 
will not exceed the whole number of officers and men captured at Appomattox. 

There is much reason for believing that the report of April 11th, the date when 
the last of Lee's troops stacked arms before Ord's men, and which if Badeau's 
version is correct could not possibly have included small arms captured elsewhere, 
gives the number of small arms surrendered by Lee's troops at Appomattox C. H. 
and that it is. perhaps, slightl}' in excess of the number of both cavalry and infan- 
try who bore arms on the morning of the 9th of April. 

Ord's troops, the army of the James, arrested our progress beyond the court 
house on the morning of the 9th, and were on the immediate vicinity of the court 
house where our troops stacked arms before some of his. after the paroles were 
made out. Gen. Gibbon, one of Ord's corps commanders, was the ranking officer 
charged with seeing to the formal surrender. Ord's ordnance officers quite 
naturally received the stacked muskets and the small ai-ms of the cavalry, and re- 
ported them as surrendered to that army, and also included in their captures of 
"cannon," field pieces taken by his troops on the retreat, and siege pieces on the 
part of the entrenchments taken by Wietzel, his other corps commander, who 
entered Richmond. 

Meade's infantry was in our rear at Appomattox, over three miles from the court 
house. His ordnance officers doubtless gathered from the trains, which were 
nearest his troops, all small arms found in the wagons which remained to us. 
In the short interval elapsing between the retreat and the hour when orders were 
given for it, the ordinance officers gathered np some muskets of the sick and 
wounded about Petersburg and put them in wagons which started with the trains; 
and after leaving Amelia many of the exhausted infantry rather than abandon 
their arms put them in the wagons. It is true that hundreds and hun- 
dreds of these wagons were captured or destroyed in the retreat at 
Sailors Creek, Painesville and Farmville, but it is probable that a 
few of these wagons reached Appomattox — and, therefore, that some 
small arms were taken from the wagons there. Meade's corps had made large 
captures of men with arms in their hands, when the Petersburg lines were broken, 
and at Five Forks and at Sailor's Creek His ordnance officers gleaned these 
battle fields, and cared for the arms. His provost marshals after his return from 
Appomattox, required citizens who had arms to turn them over. The aggregate 
of all the arms thus obtained was naturally reported by Meade's ordnance officers 
as surrendered to his army; and they as naturally included in the number of 
"cannon" not only field pieces taken at Appomattox and on the letreat, but heavy 
artillery on tlie part of the line captured by Meade's troops. 

It is quite plain, therefore, that these reports of the ordinance officers, cited 
by Badean, were intended to give the number of small arms and "cannon" which 
came into their hands between the Sth of April and the date of the making of 
these reports, without any reference to the particular place or the number at such 
place, where the "cannon" and small arms were actually captured. In no other 
way can their truth be maintained, or the large numbers of "cannon" and small 
arms, reported captured, accounted for. If there could be any doubt about this^ 
Gen. Grant himself makes it plain. In his Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 500, he speaks as 



37 

killed, and the ''missing" who were not captured; since the 
wounded, as well as the unwounded, who fell into the enemy's 
hands, were enumerated among the prisoners. 

As to the battle of Five Forks I have adopted Col. Taylor's 
estimate, although it is greater by far than developed by the 
subsequent proof in the Warren Court of Inquiry, where every- 
thing connected with that battle was elaborately investigated*. 
The official reports show that not over 4,500 prisoners were cap 
tured there and that our killed and wounded were about 1.200. 
Nevertheless, a number of men were without rations, and lost 
their way in the darkness and the demoralization of the rout, 
and were prevented by the subsequent movement of the armies 
from rejoining their commands, if they desired to do so. Judging 
by the strength of their commands next day, and sifting contem- 

a matter "of official record" of prisoners captured "between March 29th and the 
date of the surrender," and ther. says 'tlie same record shows the number of can- 
non, including those at Appomattox, to have been 689, between the dates named." 
This is the exact number of "cannon" included in those reports given in the 
official statement which Badeau relies on — to- wit, 263, 2:'l and 175 — total, 689. 

All in all, these two reports of captured small arms, in view of the well known 
facts referred to, go strongly to prove that the number of infantry surrendered' 
with arms in their hands, was about as stated by Confederate writers, and, more 
important than all, by Gen'l Robert E. Lee himself. 

B-ideau, evidently much worried by this statement, assails it in another note* 
vol. 3, p. 607. He says Lee, when asked by Grant the number of rations needed 
for his army, replied that he could not tell — among other reasons — because no re- 
turns "had been made for several days." Yet Badeau goes on to say "in spite of 
this statement of his chief," Taylor speaks of the men 'who in line of battle, on 
9th day of April, 1S65, were reported present for duty." But Lee did not say 
that no returns had been 7nade. Gen. Porter of Grant's staff, gives Lee's exact 
words: "I have not seen any returns for several days.''' This conversation 
took place on the 9th. On the 12th. three days later, Lee had evidently seen re- 
turns, for on that day he wrote his official report of the surrender, in which he 
says "according to the reports of the ordinance officers, there were 7,892 organized 
infantry with arms," &c. Ordnance officers were required to issue a full supply 
of ammunition to the infantry before the line advanced on the 9th, and this is 
probablv the time when they ascertained the number of men needing it (men 
with arms in their hands) upon which were based the reports of which Gen. Lee 
speaks. This is quite a different report from the returns of the strength of the 
commands which comes through the Adjutant General's, and not through the 
Ordnance Department. 

*It seems both the Cavalry Corps and Warren's in some instances claimed the 
capture of the same prisoners, and the official reports of both corps therefore show 
a much larger number of prisoners than were actually taken. 



38 

poraneous accounts, it is safe to say that 1,300 men above those 
killed, wounded and captured, were lost to Lee as the result of 
that battle. The same observations apply with like force to the 
losses at- places where the trenches around Petersburg were car- 
ried at the break of day, and in the rout at Sailors Creek, after 
Gordon's persistent stand there just at dusk on April 6th, and 
when Ewell's and Anderson's forces were captured. Our losses 
there can be. fairly put at more than the number of killed, 
wounded and captured reported by the enemy, for they do not in- 
clude stragglers who did not fall into their hands, but tailed to 
join their commands. What is the number of Lee's killed, which 
must be deducted from the excess above the number captured to 
ascertain the number of these absentees from other causes than 
death, captivity or wounds? Grant's losses in the final opera- 
tions were 9,994 officers and men, of whom about 2,000 were 
killed. The Confederate loss in killed was somewhat greater. 
At Five Forks, at several places on the lines, and at Sailors 
Creek, the Confederates retreated under fire, after being defeated 
in battle, and sometimes in great disorder, and their losses were 
greater than their assailants. Grant's troops, however, fell back 
under fire in Warren's fight, so did Sheridan's towards Dinwiddle. 
Grant's troops were repulsed at several places on the lines, gained 
costly success at Battery Gregg* and made unsuccessful attacks 
on field breastworks at Sutherland's Station, and when Hum- 
phreys attacked Lee near Farmville. In these actions Grant's 
losses were considerably greater than Lee's. Upon the whole, it 
is a fair estimate that Lee's losses in killed during these operations 
did not exceed twenty-five hundred. Deduct this numtjer, and 
we have 4,500 as the whole number of absentees who were lost to 
Lee from the beginning to the end of the operations, from any 
other cause than death, wounds or captivity.' Of this number of 
absentees, as we have seen, fully 2,500 were lost to Lee at Five 
Forks and on the lines on April 2d, and never started on the re- 
treat. The remainder, two thousand, dropped out of ranks be- 
tween Amelia Court-House, where the great suff"ering for food 
began, and Appomattox Court-House. The number of all these 
absentees, under the adverse circumstances, would be far from 
proving that the army was melting away. As to most of these 

*Grant lost 714 men at Battery Gregg. 



39 

absentees, their straggling or absence from their colors proves 
rather weakness of body than waning fealty to their cause. The 
fact that only two thousand of them succumbed to despair, famine, 
or temptation to abandon their colors, on that long march to Ap- 
pomattox, after nearly two weeks of continuous battle and terrible 
sutTering, affords sublime testimony to the heroic courage and for- 
titude of that other 34,000 fighting men who started on that 
memorable retreat and none of whom were absent at the end, 
save the killed, wounded and captured in battle. 

GRANDEUR OF LEE. 

In no part of his life did the grandeur of Lee shine more con- 
spicuously than now. He was the same grave, calm Commander 
in Chief; the same loveable tender man as in the days of power 
and triumph. The troops who were wont to watch his counte- 
nance to catch if possible an index of what was passing in his 
mind saw nothing there which indicated despair. It was to this 
bearing of their commander that in a large degree may be attrib- 
uted the heroic efforts which the army of Northern Virginia 
made, even to the last, to shake itself free from the t^oils of its 
mighty pursuers, I well remember on the day after Sailors 
creek, riding by som.e troops drawn up in line and momentarily 
expecting to advance upon the enemy, who were discussing the 
truth of the report that Ewell's corps had been captured there, 
and how a private produced conviction of the falsity of the news 
by indignantly asking : "Didn't you see Mars Bob when he rode 
by just now ? Did he look like Ewell's corps had been captured ?" 

At times on this retreat his bearing towards young officers 
who came about him assumed a cheerfulness that almost 
amounted to playfulness. To an officer sent by a Corps Com- 
mander to ask at what point Gen. Lee wished it to camp that 
night, he replied, "Tell him to march them to the Virginia Line." 
V/hen the officer expressed surprise and asked how far it was, the 
General pleasantly remarked, "Well then, tell him to march as 
far as he can." On another occasion Gen. Lee was enquiring for a 
place called the "Stone Chimneys'- on his map, and was told by a 
young officer who had been reared in the neighborhood that the 
place where they then were must be the one marked upon the 
map, for he remembered distinctly when the chimneys were built. 



40 

Gen. Lee, who evidently did not share the officer's confidence as to 
the locality, pleasantly remarked : " I was waiting for the guide 
to come up that we might ascertain from him, but I suppose we 
had as well go on. If you remember when the chimneys were 
built, this is not the place. The stone chimneys mentioned in 
this map were built before you were.*' 

Near Farmville he sat for some time on his horse near a sec- 
tion of Chamberlayne's battery, which on the brow of the hill was 
shelling the enemy, and gazed intently through his jilasses at 
their movements. He was quite exposed. Receiving a report 
from a staff officer. General Lee gave him a message in reply and 
as he started off said to him : "You rode up on the wrong side 
of the hill and unnecessarily exposed yourself. Why did you not 
come up on the other side ?" The officer said he was ashamed 
to shelter himself when his commander was so exposed. General 
Lee remarked to him quite sharply : "It is my duty to be here ; 
I must see. Your duty does not require you to see, or to expose 
yourself when there is no occasion for it. Ride back the way I 
tell you." 

Near Goode's Bridge he astonished a young staff officer, after 
receiving a message sent by him, by looking quite fixedly at him 
and asking if "those people surprised your command this morning?" 
The officer was taken aback at the question, for he had just made 
a report from his commander that the troops were in good order, 
and apked directions for their disposition. He replied no, and 
asked if any such report had come to him. General Lee replied 
that he had received no such report, but that "judging from ap- 
pearances something urgent must have prevented you young men 
about headquarters from making your toilets this morning," and 
he thought it possible that the command might have been sur- 
prised. At the same time he pointed to the officer's new cavalry 
boots, the leg of one being outside of the pants, while on the other 
the leather was half sluflFed inside the pants, making that leg some- 
what resemWe a huge misshapen bologna- sausage. The young officer 
had not observed this until his attention was called to it, and his 
face turned blood-red at the rebuke, and he could not conceal his 
mortification as he saluted and started to return. 

Gen. Lee then called him back and said he intended onlj'^ to 
caution him as to the duty of officers, especially those who 
were near the persons of high commanders, to avoid anything on 



41 

a retreat which might look like demoralization ; that he knew he 
was a good soldier,and he must not take his caution so much to heart- 
So self-contained and so considerate was this great man of the feel- 
ings of others that he paused in the trying moments, w'hen the 
destiny of a Nation and the fate of a retreating army were engross- 
ing all his care, to soothe the wounded feelings of a young subal- 
tern. 

When one of the columns was some distance from Amelia 
Springs, two men, young and handsome, well mounted and 
dressed as Confederate officers, joined the troops, and rode some 
distance with them. Their actions excited suspicion and they were 
arrested and searched. On one of them was found a dispatch from 
Sheridan to Grant. The two men then confessed that they were 
scouts and spies for Sheridan. 

A staff officer was directed to carry the dispatch to Gen'l. Lee, 
and also to ask "what disposition to make of the spies," who now 
momentarily expected to be led out to execution. Gen. Lee was 
found late that night, at his head-quarters near Amelia Springs, 
and the dispatch and message delivered. He enquired briefly of 
the circumstances of the arrest of the two men, and whether any 
information other than that sent him had been extracted from them. 
Being answered, he turned to give instructions to some other offi- 
cers, telling the staff officer to wait, he would give him his answer 
presently. When he had finished giving his instructions to other 
officers who were waiting, he again turned to the staff officer as if 
about to speak to him, but remained silent for more than a minute 
when he said, "Tell the general the lives of so many of our own 
men are at stake that all my thoughts now must be given to dis- 
posing of them. Let him keep the prisoners until he hears fur- 
ther from me." At the time it did not occur to the officer, though 
it did shortly' afterwards, when the surrender freed these spies of 
their peril, that Gen'l. Lee was thinking, while he paused, that a 
few hours would decide the fate of his armj'-, and that if the army 
were lost, the execution of the men would be useless, and debat- 
ing in his own mind, whether, under the circumstances, duty for- 
bade his showing pity for his captives, and giving them a chance 
for their lives, by delaying a decision which, if made then, would, 
according to all the laws of war, inevitably doom them to death. 



42 

KEASONS FOK HOPING SUCCESS. 

There are some who teach the children sprung from the 
loins of the Confederate soldier that it was folly to nurse 
the hope that the men of 1861 could maintain their under- 
taking. Their convictions of honor and duty left them no al- 
ternative; but were it otherwise, can it be matter ol reproach that 
they bared their own breasts to the storm rather than bequeath 
the battle to their children ? 

The falsity of the so called maxim, that "God favors the heav- 
iest battallions" was signally illustrated by Napoleon throughout 
the greater part of his marvelous career. Charles XII of Swe- 
den set it at naught. Frederick tbe Great won victory in spite 
of it, in the Seven Years War against nearly all Europe. Alex- 
ander, Hannibal and Cgesar in ancient days taught that numbers 
did not necessarily win battles. 

The thought ignores Providence, and forgets the influences of 
moral forces in the work of war. All history sustains the pro- 
found philosopher, who declared that other maxim, "In war the 
moral is to the physical as three to one," and that maxim fights 
for the invaded against the invader. 

The history of Western Europe did not allow the conclusion 
that it would respect the thin blockade which prevented the ex- 
change of our great products in the markets of the world, and 
kept from us money, supplies and munitions which could not be 
had at home. 

There was reasonable hope, if the contest long continued, that 
the interests and rivalries of the outside world would raise up 
allies for us, as in the Revolution of our fathers.* 

*The Seizure of Mason and Slidell from an English vessel on the high seas' 
and the irritations and complications growing out of the French occupation of 
Mexico, came near involving the United States in conflict with those powers. 
The thin, almost "paper" blockades, maintained for a time on parts of the South- 
ern coast, afforded constant provocations of trouble with the outside world, and 
so also of questions with foreign powers, which recognized the Confederate States 
as "belligerents," as to allowing our privateers to remain in their ports, the sale of 
ships, munitions of war, &c., &c , as where the Wachusetts attacked and cap- 
tured the privateer Florida in the Brazilian port of Bahia. 



43 

History taught that critical periods always arise in such a strug- 
gle, when military disaster or great sacrifice paralyze a represen- 
tative government in carrying on a long war of invasion.* 

*Such crises more than once threatened to bring invasion to a halt, during the 
last two years of th^ war. 

In 1863 there was intense opposition to the draft and the methods of President 
Lincoln's administration both in the East and in the West. The terrible draft 
riots in New York city occurred while Meade was yet about Gettysburg. Had 
he been defeated there, the Government would have been compelled to call back 
its invading columns to enable it to maintain itself at home and save its capital. 
Such a result, a practical defensive, in the third year of the war, would have so 
greatly impaired, if not destroyed, the credit of the Government, and so strength- 
ened the opposition at home, that it would have been impossible to fill the depleted 
armies, or successfully prosecute further invasion. 

Another still more critical period arose in the latter part of the Summer of 1864. 
In the Spring of that year the Confederates had crushed an invading force in 
Florida, and practically ended tne seige of Charleston. Banks had been defeated 
with great loss in his Red River campaign, and Sherman, after the defeat of 
his cavalry, compelled to fall back from his attempted invasion of Mississippi, and 
Hoke had captured Plymouth and expelled the enemy from North Carolina, while 
the Confederates had met with no corresponding back-sets. 

Sherman had penetrated near Atlanta, but with considerable loss, and his ability 
to either capture the city or destroy Johnston's army was doubted, while few 
thought he could long maintain himself so far inland, and many believed he must 
finally retreat, which he could not do without great disaster. Grant had sustained 
fearful losses in the Wilderness, at Spottsylvania, at Cold Harbor, in assaults on 
Petersburg, and at the Mine explosion. The Confederates still holding Grant at 
arm's length before Richmond, had invaded Maryland and thrown an army up to 
the very walls of Washington, driven Hunter from Lynchburg, defeated Seigel in 
the Valley, and bottled up Butler at Bermuda Hundreds. 

To popular conception of the North, the invading armies appeared at this time as 
far, if not farther, from accomplishing their task than in 1862, and there was great 
and almost universal despondency as to the final result of the war in the Northern 
mind. The depreciation of the currency was very great, and the strain of the war 
also added to the general feeling of despair. The Confederate cruisers had de- 
stroyed the United States merchant marine and practically driven it 
from the high seas. To cap it all came another of the intermin- 
able succession of drafts, demanding half a million more men to fill up 
the depleted armies, which still further fed public discontent and aroused most 
bitter opposition to further war of invasion. 

Halleck, who was then Chief of Staff at Washington, writes Grant that alarm- 
ing combinations were forming ia several Northern States to resist the draft. He 
says: "The draft must be enforced, for otherwise the army can not be kept up, 
but to enforce it may require the withdrawal of a considerable number of troops 
from the field. I call your attention to it now that you may make your arrange- 
ments accordingly." "A^e not appearances such that we 'ought to take in sail, 
and prepare for a storm '" Grant, on the 15th day of August, replies that the 
loyal governors must enforce the draft with their militia. "If we are to draw 



44 

Frederick the Great said that '^an array, like a serpent, moves 
on its belly," and it was a rule of Caesars, in conducting inva- 
sions, that ''war must support war." In a thinly settled country 
like ours, war could not be made to support war ; since under 
such conditions "concentration starves itself." The offensive 
power of an army is gone at along distance from its source of 
supply; and the necessity of maintaining long lines of commu- 
nication often causes the retreat of the invader, though the in- 
vaded flees before him. 

The character and expanse of country through which the in- 
vading armies must operate was, up to that time, a justification 
of the belief that the conquest of the South was impossible. 

In the Kevolution, England generally controlled the sea-board, 
but the river breezes were fitful and unsate motive power for her 
sail vessels on our rivers , and she could not maintain depots of 

troops from the field to keep the loyal States in harness, it will prove difficult to 
suppress the rebellion in the disloyal States. My withdrawal from the James 
ivould ensure the defeat o_f Shertnan." A week before Grant had written Sher- 
man about reinforcing him, concurring in the latter's view "about showing no de- 
spondency" and expressing the opinion "we must win, ij 7iot defeated at home" 
At that time, probably a majority' of the voters at 'the North felt that war as a 
means of saving the Union was a failure, and the morale of the armies in the field 
were afiected by the action of this opinion from their homes. Grant says, Me- 
moirs, Vol. 2, p. 167, "anything that could have prolonged the war a j-ear beyond 
the time it did finallv close, would probably have exhausted the North to such an 
extent that they might then have abandoned the contest, and agree i to a separa- 
tion." 

All sources show that at this time there was great danger of a complete collapse 
of the war spirit of the North, and if the military successes at Atlanta and Win- 
chester and Cedar Creek in September and October had not opportunely come to 
Mr. Lincoln's rescue just before the presidential election of November following, 
the "Peace Party" would have prevailed. Indeed, even after the fall of Atlanta, 
if Early, whose army had so nearly crushed Sheridan's on the 19th of October, 
had been able to finish the work, and to again invade Maryland and bring his 
army before Washington, it needs no seer to predict its eff'ect on the Northern 
mind, or the change it would have produced in the presidential election. As it was 
over a million and a half of voters at the North expressed their dissatisfaction at 
the conduct of the war, and a desire in preference to save the Union by negoti- 
ations. 

It admits of little doubt, if Sherman had been held oft" at Atlanta as Grant was 
at Richmond, and Early had been able to maintain his hold of the Valley, until 
after Nov. 6th, that the public opinion at the North would have destroyed the 
power of the government to continue a war of invasion. On such slender threads 
depend the fate of nations, and the chances of war give rise to many of them in 
a long contest such as ours was. 



45 

supplies for any larire force, at any distance from the sea. It was 
not thought possible, under the art of war as known in 1861, 
that steam vessels could maintain inland navigation for any 
distance, in the face of modern shore batteries, or that railroads 
could be effectually operated through hostile country. 

At last it was the power of the iron-clad steamer and the suc- 
cessful use of the railroad in maintaining long lines of com- 
munication — the first then unknown, and the latter then 
untested in war — combined with the control of the sea-board 
which under Providence compassed our overthrow. Without the 
iron-clad steamer. Grant could not have brought or subsisted his 
army before Vicksbuig. The historic ten months' seige which re- 
sulted in the fall of Richmond, would not have been written. The 
march to the sea and through the Carolinas could never have been 
undertaken, if a hostile navy had not controlled the coast. 
Without the railroad Sherman could not have reached Atlanta, nor 
Rosencrans have obtained a foot-hold at Chattanooga. 

Who so impeaches the wisdom of our countrymen for engaging 
in unequal war, "may equally denounce Hancock and Adams 
and Washington and Jefferson, who declared the infant colonies 
independent States, and defiled the power of the greatest military 
government then on the globe." 

THE PRIVATE SOLDIER OF THE A. N, V. 

Who that looked on the pi:ivate soldier of the Army of North- 
ern Virginia can ever forget his bright face, his tattered jacket and 
crownless hat — his jests which tickled the very ribs of death — his 
weary marches in cold and heat and storm — his pangs of hunger, 
his parching fevers, his wounds — his passing away in woods or 
roadside when the weak body freed the dauntless soul — his bare 
feet tracking the rugged fields of Virginia and Maryland and 
Pennsylvania, some times with stains like those that reddened 
the snow at Valley Forge — his clinging to his colors while 
wife and child at home clutched at his courage with cries for 
bread — his hope and faith and patience to the end — his love of 
home — deference to woman and trust in God — his courage which 
sounded all the depths and shoals of misfortune, and for a time 
throttled fate itself — or the ringing yell of his onset, his battle an- 



46 

them for native land, rising Heavenwards above the roar of an hun- 
dred stormy fields ? 

Who can forget his homeward march, after the end came, un- 
stained by violence or wrong, and how the paroled prisoner be- 
came the citizen who won the admiration and wonder of the 
world ? Let us emulate his example ; and if misfortune or disaster 
bear us down, let us draw inspiration, as he did, from the sublime 
iaith and fortitude of Lee, in the darkest hours of his life, and 
"trust to work out." 



At the close of the address, Colonel Richard L. Maury offered the 
following resolution : 

Resolved, That the thanks of this Association be tendered Gover- 
nor Thomas G. Jones, of Alabama, for his able address on " The 
Last Days of the Army of Northern Virginia," and that a copy of 
same be requested for publication and the archives of the Associa- 
tion. 

Adopted unanimously. 

Major Thomas A. Brander moved that a committee of five be ap- 
pointed to propose the names of the officers and the Executive Com- 
mittee for the ensuing year. Adopted ; and the following gentlemen 
were appointed : Thomas A. Brander, E. C. Minor, William Kean, 
Charles S. Morgan and A. W. Garber. 

OTHER ADDRESSES. 

In response to calls, Captain W. Gordon McCabe responded in a 
brief but beautiful address. 

By this time the committee returned, and reported the names of 
the following gentlemen as officers for the ensuing year, and the re- 
port was unanimously agreed to: 

President — ^Judge George L. Christian. 

First Vice-President — ^Judge T. S. Garnett. 

Second Vice-President — General Thomas L. Rosser. 

Third Vice-President — Hon. R. T. Barton. 

Secretary— Captain Thomas EUett. 

Treasurer — Private Robert J. Bosher. 

Executive Committee — Colonel W. E. Cutshaw (chairman). Pri- 
vate J. T. Gray, Captain E. P. Reeve, Captain John Cussons, and 
Captain W. Gordon McCabe. 

On motion, the meeting adjourned. 



life; 



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;;■. 



